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Lawyering for the Child: Principles of
Representation in Custody and Visitation
Disputes Arising from Divorce*
Few decisions are as agonizing for a trial judge or for other public
decisionmakers as choosing between disputants for the custody of a
child.' The decision is particularly difficult when it arises in divorce
proceedings rather than in abuse, neglect, or adoption proceedings,
because standards of minimal care2 or standards identifying the "psy-
chological parent" of the child3 rarely produce determinate results.
* The field research for this Note was made possible by a grant from the Foundation
for Child Development. The assistance of the following faculty members of the Yale Law
School is gratefully acknowledged: Professor Stanton Wheeler in developing the research
design and in interpreting the results, and Professors Geoffrey Hazard, Barbara Under-
wood, and Stephen Wizner for providing criticism and reassurance. Most important were
the practitioners, who graciously shared their time and experience.
1. [T]he custody matters are the type that I get personally involved in, and when I
go home I do lose sleep over them. I worry about whether I have done the right thing
or the wrong thing or done what is best for the child. Now, I have had some serious
criminal cases where some sentences were given to these defendants and then I felt
I was doing my duty, period, and that is all there was to it. But with these custody
cases, I take them home with me and I worry about them.
Interview with Hon. Harold Missal, Judge, Connecticut Superior Court, in New Haven,
Connecticut, at 11-12 (Dec. 7, 1977) (transcript on file with Yale Law Journal) [herein-
after cited without cross reference as Judge Missal]; accord, B. BOTEIN, TRIAL JUDGE 273
(1952); see Ellsworth & Levy, Legislative Reform of Child Custody Adjudication, 4 LAW
& Soc'y REV. 167, 168 (1969) (citing dissatisfaction with methods and results of custody
adjudication expressed by state commissions).
2. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. 9- INST. CODE § 18951(e) (West Supp. 1977) (defining child
abuse); N.Y. FAi. CT. ACT § 1012(e), (f) (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1977) (defining abused
child and neglected child); IJA-ABA, JUVENILE JUsTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT 10-11 (1977) (proposing standards).
3. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
98 (1973) ("A psychological parent is one who, on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through
interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological
needs for a parent, as well as the child's physical needs.") [hereinafter cited as BEYOND
THE BEST INTERESTS]. But see A. FREUD, Painter v. Bannister: Postscript by a Psycho-
analyst, in 7 THE WRITINGS OF ANNA FREUD 247, 253 (1968) (defining child's father as
"the adult man to whom the child attaches a particular, psychologically distinctive set
of feelings").
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In the typical divorce custody4 litigation,5 both competing parents
have been involved in caring for and fulfilling the psychological needs
of the child, and both exceed minimum standards of parental fitness.
6
Among the many procedural reforms proposed to reduce the am-
biguity and uncertainty in divorce custody adjudications, the intro-
duction of legal representation for the child has received widespread
support7 and has been implemented in twenty-four jurisdictions.8
4. The issues for judicial determination may include custody, visitation arrangements,
or both. Either issue may be raised when the parents first decide to separate, when the
divorce action is heard in court, or during subsequent actions to modify the initial
decree. A decision on either issue involves consideration of both issues, because the
family's continuing accommodation to the consequences of parental divorce affects all
relationships among family members. Although the emotional turmoil in the family
may implicate the legal system in other ways-investigation of abuse or neglect, kid-
napping charges, or motions for contempt-this Note uses "divorce custody" to refer to
custody or visitation disputes brought to court before, after, or at the time of divorce.
5. The custody determination is assumed to be contested. The role of the child's
lawyer when custody is uncontested is not discussed in this Note, since legislatures in-
creasingly have established that judicial investigation is to be limited to cases where
a contest over custody appears in the pleadings. An example is provided by Connecticut,
where appointment of counsel for the child was at one time mandatory when an agree-
ment was submitted with respect to the custody or visitation of the child. This quickly
was seen as impractical, and within a year the appointment was made discretionary.
Berdon, A Child's Right to Counsel in a Contested Custody Proceeding Resulting from
a Termination of the Marriage, 50 CONN. B.J. 150, 155 n.19 (1976).
To simplify language, the term "parent" in this Note, except where otherwise in-
dicated, will refer to a parental figure party to a custody dispute, who may in fact be
a grandparent, other relative, or other person with no biological tie to the child (e.g.,
a stepparent). Although divorce custody disputes can include more than two disputants,
as when a grandparent is permitted to intervene in addition to the two biological parents,
this Note will assume a two-party dispute. Also, except where otherwise indicated, ref-
erence to "the child" in this Note includes instances where more than one child is
represented by an attorney in the same litigation.
6. See Mlyniec, The Child Advocate in Private Custody Disputes: A Role in Search
of a Standard, 16 J. FAf. L. 1, 14 (1977-1978) (standard preferring psychological parent
and disqualifying parent who endangers health of child "has little utility where two
fit parents who have lived together and jointly raised a child each seek[s] custody");
Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy,
39 LAW & CONTENIP. PROB. 226, 286-87 (1975) (existing psychological theories do not provide
basis for choosing between two adults "where the child has some relationship and psy-
chological attachment to each").
7. Among the vast and expanding legal scholarship calling for the appointment of
counsel for the child are BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 3, at 66; Berdon, supra
note 5; Drinan, The Rights of Children Whose Parents are Divorced, 1962 U. ILL. L.F.
618; Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAN. L.Q. 343 (1972); Genden,
Separate Legal Representation of Children: Protecting the Rights and Interests of Mi-
nors in Judicial Proceedings, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 565 (1976); Hansen, Guardians
Ad Litem in Divorce and Custody Cases: Protection of the Child's Interests, 4 J. FAM.
L. 181 (1964); Inker 9- Perretta, A Child's Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, 5 FAm.
L.Q. 108 (1971); Podell, The "Why" Behind Appointing Guardians Ad Litem for Children
in Divorce Proceedings, 57 MARQ. L. REv. 103 (1973); Shepherd, Solomon's Sword: Adju-
dication of Child Custody Questions, 8 U. RgcH. L. REv. 151 (1974); Note, A Child's
Due Process Right to Counsel in Divorce Custody Proceedings, 27 HASTINcs L.J. 917 (1976).
8. Nineteen jurisdictions use the terms attorney or counsel for the child. ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.65.130 (Supp. 1977); Amiz. REv. STAT. § 25-321 (1976); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4606 (West
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Critics, however, have expressed concern that the role of counsel for
the child is dangerously lacking in definition or that it merely dupli-
cates roles already performed by other actors in the proceeding.' 0
Part I of this Note examines the child's interests both in the out-
come of divorce custody litigation between his parents-the custody
and visitation arrangements-and in the process of litigation itself.
Because neither the parents nor the court can adequately protect
all of these interests, Part I concludes that separate legal representa-
tion for the child is appropriate. Part II then examines the role con-
ceptions of counsel for the child that appear in legal writing and
practice. Based on a study of Connecticut attorneys who have acted
as counsel for children in divorce custody cases, Part II concludes
that the proffered role conceptions are both theoretically inadequate
and poorly responsive to the problems faced in actual custody liti-
gation.
Parts III and IV establish a new focus for analyzing the role by
examining the lawyer's relations to other actors in the process. Fears
about abuses of the role of counsel for the child in each of these
relations are considered in light of the experience of the Connecticut
practitioners. This experience shows the fears to be unfounded and
indicates principles that should guide the attorney's representation
Supp. 1977); COLO. RIv. STAT. § 14-10-116 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46-43 (1977); DEL.
CODE tit. 13, § 721 (Supp. 1977); D.C. CODE § 16-918 (1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.12
(West Supp. 1977); Ky. REv. STAT. § 403.090 (Supp. 1976) (friend of the court); MD. CTs.
& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-604 (Supp. 1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 48-324 (Cum.
Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-358 (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.Y. FA.. CT. Acr §§ 242,
249 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1977) (law guardian); OHiO R. Civ. P. 8 75(B)(2) (court
may appoint both guardian ad litem and legal counsel); OR. REv. STAT. 8 107.425 (1975);
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 11.10 (Vernon Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-11.2
(1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 594 (1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.110 (Supp. 1977).
Five jurisdictions use only the term guardian ad litem. HAW. REv. STAT. § 571-46(8)
(1976); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 215, § 56A (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518.165 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458:17-a (Supp. 1973); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 247.045 (West Supp. 1977).
9. See Mlyniec, supra note 6, at 8 (criticizing general lack of guidance in statutes on
tasks to be performed).
10. See, e.g, Solender, The Guardian Ad Litem: A Valuable Representative or an
Illusory Safeguard?, 7 TEx. TEcH. L. REv. 619, 642-43 (1976) (guardian ad litem system
does little but provide fees for young lawyers).
Severe criticism has come from a judge in the New York Family Court:
There is little that counsel for the child can contribute to the fact finding unless
by some mere fortuity he is better prepared on the case than the other attorneys
or is a more competent interrogator. . . .Legal Aid Society lawyers, who regularly
act as "law guardians" for children in the Family Court's neglect and abuse pro-
ceedings, do contribute acumen, perspective, and diligence in tapping resources. Save
for this exception, however, the experience and expertise of the child's counsel is
generally far less than the judge's in making the ultimate custody determination.
Dembitz, Book Review, 83 YALE L.J. 1304, 1312-13 (1974) (reviewing BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS, supra note 3).
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of the child. Part III discusses the attorney's primary relationship
with the child client, and Part IV examines the attorney's interac-
tions with the parents and their attorneys, with investigative agencies
and psychological professionals, and with the judge. The Note pro-
poses principles of representation that recognize the child's need for
explanation and participation to the extent of his own desire and
capacity, that establish an affirmative duty of the child's counsel to
the parents in order to preserve the child's emotional attachments,
and that guide the attorney in serving the child's interests in the
process of litigation itself and not merely in the outcome of the
adjudication.
I. The Need for Separate Legal Representation
A. The Child's Interests in Divorce Custody Litigation
As the subject of the custody dispute, the child of divorcing parents
has immediate and lasting interests in the custody decision before
the court. The choice of custodial parent will influence the child's
personality and personal attachments, and the process of litigation
may itself put the child's well-being in jeopardy. Empirical studies
show great variation in the responses of children to the divorce of
their parents," but the threat to a child's welfare introduced by
11. The most ambitious study to date is the Children of Divorce Project in Marin
County, California, which began in 1970 and involves 131 children from 60 divorcing
families. Data from observations of the children at the time of divorce and at one
)ear after divorce are reported in Wallerstein & Kelly, The Effects of Parental Divorce:
Experiences of the Preschool Child, 14 J. Am. AcAD. CHILD PSYCH. 600 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Preschool Child]; Kelly & WalIerstein, The Effects of Parental Divorce: Experi-
ences of the Child in Early Latency, 46 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHiATRY 20 (1976) ("early latency"
defined as ages seven to eight) [hereinafter cited as Early Latency]; Wallerstein & Kelly,
The Effects of Parental Divorce: Experiences of the, Child in Later Latency, 46 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCIHATRY 256 (1976) (ages nine to ten) [hereinafter cited as Later Latency];
Wallerstein & Kelly, The Effects of Parental Divorce: The Adolescent Experience, in 3
THE CHILD IN His FAMILY: CHILDREN AT PSYCHIATRIC RISK 479 (E. Anthony & C. Kou-
pernik eds. 1974) (ages 13 and older) [hereinafter cited as Adolescencel [volume here-
inafter cited as CHILD IN His FAMILY]; Kelly 8&- Wallerstein, Part-Time Parent, Part-Time
Child: Visiting After Divorce, 1977 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCH. 51 [hereinafter cited as
Part-Time Parent]. Kelly and Wallerstein note that the response of children to parental
divorce varies considerably according to developmental stage and, from about age four
up, within each developmental stage:
We do not find an observable progression of defined stages in the child's response
to his parents' separation and divorce. We see shared, age-related responses to sep-
aration and divorce . . . . Compared to adults, the child's response is more tied
to his developmental stage, his environment, and parent-child relationship vicissitudes,
including accessibility to the noncustodial parent. These and other reasons may ren-
der the child's response to divorce more idiosyncratic in timing and intensity.
Kelly & Wallerstein, Brief Interventions with Children in Divorcing Families, 47 Am.
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divorce is not disputed.12 The disruption divorce produces in a child's
family relationships and in his sense of security has an immediate
impact and may produce serious long-term consequences. Measurable
harms to children include loss of self-esteem' 3 and interruption in
psychological development. 14 Anxiety and fantasies of personal guilt,'5
as well as an increased incidence of psychosomatic illness,' 6 are also fre-
J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 23, 29-30 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Brief Interventions]; accord, L.
TESSMAN, CHILDREN OF PARTING PARENTS 506 (1978) (children's methods of coping with
divorce vary according to differences in personality structure); Anthony, Children at Risk
from Divorce: A Review, in CHILD IN His FAMILY, supra at 461, 463 (child's general
sensitivity, age, intelligence, and level of emotional participation in family affect response
to divorce); Kalter, Children of Divorce in an Outpatient Psychiatric Population, 47
Amt. J. ORTHOPSYCHiATRY 40, 48 (1977) (important to take into account age, sex, and
whether child settles into one-parent or stepparent home); McDermott, Parental Divorce
in Early Childhood, 124 Am. J. PSYCH. 1424, 1424 (1968) (child's reactions depend on age,
sex, extent and nature of family disharmony before divorce, and character of relation-
ships with parents and siblings).
12. See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 11, at 462-63 (summarizing risks that child may be-
come psychiatrically disturbed during period of childhood, that child may turn away
from marriage as unsatisfactory mode of human relationship or repeat parents' lack
of success in it, and that child may develop psychiatric disorders in adult life); Brief
Interventions, supra note 11, at 39 ("divorce is stressful for most children and constitutes
a potential developmental interference").
That children are placed at risk by parental divorce does not mean that they in-
evitably suffer irreparable damage from it. As one psychiatrist explained: "We should
bear in mind that events experienced as traumatic may be either sources of neurotic
conflict or spurs to personality growth. The specific circumstances determine whether
the divorce is experienced destructively or constructively." Westman, Effect of Divorce
on a Child's Personality Development, MEn. AsPEcrs HUMAN SEXUALITY, Jan. 1972, at
38, 41. From the oldest preschool ages, children are capable of experiencing parental
divorce without breaking developmental stride. Preschool Child, supra note 11, at 615.
This ability increases as the child grows older. Where older children are able to master
"the inner and outer events" of divorce, adversity may actually enhance development.
Adolescence, supra note 11, at 503. The literature indicates that children of divorce re-
ferred for therapy have a "lesser incidence of anxiety, neurotic symptoms, and habit for-
mation problems" than children referred who were from "intact" families. Kalter, supra
note 11, at 41 (emphasis in original). But cf. Anthony, The Syndrome of the Psycho-
logically Invulnerable Child, in CHILD IN His FAMILY, supra note 11, at 529, 540 (re-
porting study of children in variety of disrupted families; even seemingly "invulnerable
child" attains invulnerability at some psychological cost).
13. Preschool Child, supra note 11, at 606; Later Latency, supra note 11, at 269;
see Early Latency, supra note 11, at 23 (most striking response to parental separation
is pervasive sadness and grieving); Adolescence, supra note 11, at 485-86 (virtually all
adolescents in study experienced parental divorce as extraordinarily painful event ac-
companied by feelings of shame and embarrassment).
14. Most younger children go into an initial period of regression following parental
separation. McDermott, supra note 11, at 1431; Preschool Child, supra note 11, at 602.
In older children, the developmental disruption may take the form of precocious, pseu-
domature behavior. Later Latency, supra note 11, at 266; cf. Adolescence, supra note
11, at 483 (hazard carries potential for developmental spurt, which, if not too premature,
may facilitate achievement of independence and maturity).
15. Brief Interventions, supra note I1, at 25; Watson, The Children of Armageddon:
Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 8vRAcusE L. REv. 55, 78 (1969).
16. Brief Interventions, supra note 11, at 26. This effect may be limited to older
children. Id.
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quent effects of parental divorce. When a father is absent because
of divorce, a child's ability to develop a healthy self-concept and
sexual identity may be impaired.
17
The child is thus necessarily influenced by the court's choice of
custodial parent and visitation arrangements.18 But the child's inter-
ests also include a substantial stake in the process of choosing-a stake
that may be threatened by the parents' goals and conduct in the di-
vorce custody dispute. During legal disputes arising from divorce,
the child may be exposed to manipulation, anger, or rejection by one
or both parents.' 9 Accusations of blame and unfitness are common
20
since parents often use custody proceedings to vent bitter feelings
or to gain leverage in the financial settlement. 21 The result is a con-
tentious, destructive, and often prolonged dispute that may seriously
threaten the possibility of a workable arrangement for visitation be-
tween the child and the parent who ultimately is denied custody.22
17. Hetherington & Duer, The Effects of Father Absence on Child Development, 1971
YOUNG CHILDREN 233, 235, 238; Westman, supra note 12, at 42, 46-49, 54. The problem
of father absence is not simply one of the absence of a male figure. Living with a stepfather
carries problems of its own for children and is particularly stressful for girls. Kalter,
supra note 11, at 44-47.
Studies of father absence yield varying results depending on the cause of the absence.
Hetherington & Duer, supra at 234, 242; Herzog & Sudia. Children in Fatherless Families,
in 3 REviEW OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 141, 162-63 (B. Caldwell & H. Riccuiti
eds. 1973) (widowed family better able to deal with loss than divorced or deserted family).
Variations may also exist among families with different demographic characteristics, but
these differences have not yet been established. Herzog & Sudia, supra at 157-60.
18. See note 4 supra.
19. One commentator summarized the possibilities for using the child in manipulative
ways:
1. The child is used as a means of depriving a parent of affection in retaliation
for the deprivation of affection that the other parent experienced.
2. The child is used as a means of insuring continued attachment to the divorced
spouse.
3. Total allegiance to one parent is demanded with the concurrent total rejec-
tion of the other so that the child becomes the weakened puppet of parental needs.
4. The child is used as direct hostage for payment of money or services.
Harris, The Child as Hostage, in CHILDREN OF SEPARATION AND DIVORCE (I. Stuart & L.
Abt eds. 1972).
20. L. TESS.IAN, supra note 11, at 278; Watson, supra note 15, at 60-61.
21. See Note, The Role of the Child's Wishes in California Custody Proceedings, 6
U. CAL. D.L. REV. 332, 346 (1973) (parents use custody battle to vent bitter feelings or
to prove innocence in breakup even in state where divorce granted on no-fault basis);
Interview with Yale Sappern, Assistant Clerk of New Haven County Superior Court, at
7 (Dec. 17, 1977) (transcript on file with Yale Law Journal) (citing frequency of fathers
using threat of custody battle to get reduction in alimony) [hereinafter cited as Sappern
Interview].
22. See Part-Time Parent, supra note 11, at 54 (factors associated with divorcing
process itself have "central influence" on divorcing parent and on resulting visitation);
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Here the child's interests in the process and in the outcome of the
proceeding are closely connected: children generally benefit from
amicable contact with the noncustodial parent and suffer without it.23
Parents embittered by a rancorous divorce or custody action often
vent these feelings in the presence of the child and may sabotage the
child's relationship with the noncustodial parent.24
Less tied to a particular disposition of the custody dispute but no
less important to the child is the pace of the litigation. The interval
between initiation and final disposition of a custody suit usually
stretches for months and may exceed a year.2 Children rarely benefit
from delay in custody proceedings, 26 yet speedy adjudication may
not suit the strategy of one or both parents2 7 or may be impeded by
E. Hetherington, M. Cox & R. Cox, The Aftermath of Divorce, at 32-33 (to be published
in MOTHER/CHILD, FATHER/CHILD RELATIONSHIPS (U. Stevens & M. Mathews eds. 1978))
(family functioning and posithe adjustment of children threatened by "conflict and ill
will between the divorced parents") [hereinafter cited as Aftermath].
23. Part-Time Parent, supra note 11, at 53 (where parent lives nearby, unvisited
child feels "unworthy and unlovable"). Wallerstein and Kelly note that visitation can be
crucial to a child because of "the intense longing that so many children experience in
regard to infrequent or nonvisiting parents." Wallerstein & Kelly, Divorce Counseling:
A Community Service for Families in the Midst of Divorce, 47 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY
4, 15 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Divorce Counseling]. Yet they also note that temporary
or permanent loss of contact with one parent may be preferable to ongoing litigation
by the noncustodial parent. Id. at 16. It has been argued that visitation should be at
the sole discretion of the custodial parent. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 3, at 38.
24. See BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 3, at 38 ("Children have difficulty in
relating positively to, profiting from, and maintaining the contact with two psychological
parents who are not in positive contact with each other."); Divorce Counseling, supra
note 23, at 12 (citing clinical cases where parents used children "as extensions of their
angers and their wishes for vengeance" and ruined previously good relationships be-
tween children and noncustodial parents); Part-Time Parent, supra note 11, at 53 (citing
cases where court imposed rigid visitation schedule unresponsive to child's needs; schedule
necessitated by inability of parents to respond flexibly because of intense "angers," par-
ticularly associated with court battles).
25. Telephone Interview with Yale Sappern, Assistant Clerk of New Haven County
Superior Court (Feb. 27, 1978) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal) (average five-week
wait for first hearing on contested custody or visitation motions; average three-to-fie
month duration of suit involving Family Relations Division investigation and attorney
for child; suits stretch beyond one year with modification motions) [hereinafter cited
as Sappern Phone Interview].
26. See BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 3, at 43 (to avoid irreparable psy-
chological injury, custody decisions must be treated as emergencies). But see note 101 infra
(describing case where slowing pace was in child's interests). The Note authors handled
a case in which a 10-year-old client wanted a delay over the summer vacation so that
he could live with both parents and decide which he preferred.
27. One delaying tactic used by parents' attorneys is to move for custody or visitation
pendente lite orders even when the attorney is ready to try the case on the final order.
The clerk in charge of family relations in the New Haven County Superior Court
described this tactic:
What they do is if they think they're possibly a loser, they won't claim it for trial
but will ask for pendente lite orders because you have what they call "two bites at
the apple." You lose on the pendente lite motion and you still have the final hearing.
The final hearing is de novo. You try the same thing all over. If you're a loser on
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congested court calendars. 28 The instability and uncertainty brought
on by divorce and exacerbated by the nature of the custody proceed-
ing can be especially harmful to infants and preschool children, who
have the most difficulty in comprehending uncertainty and in coping
with disruption.2 9
Ultimately, the child's interests in the process and the outcome
of the custody proceeding merge because an adjudication by the court
does not necessarily make the child's placement secure: subject to
certain conditions that vary among jurisdictions, the noncustodial
parent may move to modify custody or visitation decrees. 30 This op-
portunity to modify may be detrimental to the children because it
prolongs the uncertainty and turns the initial court decision into
one step of an ongoing process. Modification actions are particularly
harmful to the child when used by a parent to harass the former
spouse.31 At times, however, modification may benefit the child. The
custodial parent's ability to provide competent and supportive care
may wane; a child's need for one parent at an early stage of develop-
ment may give way to a need for the greater influence of the other
parent at a later stage.3 2 Without separate legal representation, the
pendente lite you get another bite at the apple at the final hearing because the
judge can't say, "that's been decided already," because pendente lite is not a final
order. In fact, you can benefit from your mistakes. If you made a bad presentation,
now you know how to go in and change it.
Sappern Interview, supra note 21, at 19.
28. See Sappern Phone Interview, supra note 25; cf. BEYOND THE BEST INTErMsTs, supra
note 3, at 42-43 (criticizing length of time required for custody case to be processed).
29. BEYOND THE BEsT INTEREsTs, supra note 3, at 41-42; see Preschool Child, supra
note 11, at 602, 608.
30. The substantive standard for modification of a custody decree in most jurisdic-
tions is that there be a "substantial change of circumstances since the time of the award
under attack" and a demonstration that new circumstances require a change in custody
to promote the best interests of the child. Foster & Freed, Child Custody (pt. 2), 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 615, 623 (1964). But see Simons v. Simons, 172 Conn. 341, 346, 350 (1977)
(requirement of material change in circumstances must be balanced against best interests
of child and is one element in larger question of what is in child's best interests). Time
restrictions may also be imposed on modification motions. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE Aar § 409(a) (no motion to modify custody decree may be made earlier than
two years after its date) (enacted in five states). Most jurisdictions, however, do not set
time limits. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.18 (West 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.410
(Vernon 1977).
31. See L. TEsSMAN, supra note 11, at 281; Watson, supra note 15, at 63-64.
32. In their study of 34 preschool children, all of whom lived with their mothers
after the divorce, Wallerstein and Kelly conclude:
[I]n our sample, the mother-child relationship following divorce showed a reversal
of the pattern observed in the father-child relationship: namely, as studied at the
one-year follow-up point, the direction of change in father-child relationships is
toward richer, more gratifying relationships, whereas for mothers, the changes are
more in the direction of deterioration over this time.
Preschool Child, supra note 11, at 614. A study of nursery school children by different
researchers drew similar though more qualified conclusions. Parenting ability was found
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child's interests are left to the inadequate protection of parents and
the court.
B. Who Represents the Child's Interests?
Parents are normally entrusted by law with providing for the basic
human needs of their child.33 But when the family unit has been
broken in a divorce custody dispute, neither parent can be presumed
to be the exclusive representative of the child. Neither parent can
be relied on to communicate to the court the child's interests that
differ from those of one or both parents.34 Attorneys for the parents
may try to take into account the child's interests, but they owe their
ultimate loyalty to the interests of their own clients. 35
It has been argued, however, that the child's interests are protected
by the judge as parens patriae. This independent responsibility of
to decline substantially in the year immediately following divorce and was particularly
serious in mother-son relationships:
Divorced parents make fewer maturity demands of their children, communicate
less well with their children, tend to be less affectionate with their children, and
show marked inconsistency in discipline and lack of control over their children in
comparison to married parents. Poor parenting is most apparent when divorced
parents, particularly the divorced mothers, are interacting with their sons.
Aftermath, supra note 22, at 21. The authors report that the decline in parenting, par-
ticularly that of mothers, is most marked one year after divorce. Id. Two years after the
divorce, the ability of mothers and fathers generally has improved, id. at 21-22, though
it never reaches predivorce levels or the level of care and control exercised by other
parents in intact families, id. at 21-23.
Wallerstein and Kelly emphasize the difficulty in predicting shifts in parenting ability:
[D]ivorce, as seen in our study, represents a nodal point of change in the parent-
child relationship, for the custodial as well as the noncustodial parent. In fact, the
changes in the parent-child relationships in some age groups are at times startling
and not predictable from earlier, predivorce modes of relationship.
Divorce Counseling, supra note 23, at 6 (footnote omitted); accord, Westman, supra note
12, at 42.
33. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1971); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care, and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include prepara-
tion for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.") But see Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (pregnant minor's right to abortion without parental
consent); In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1977) (in-
voluntary civil commitment by parent of teenaged child not allowed without hearing).
34. Bersoff, Representation for Children in Custody Decisions: All That Glitters is
not Gault, 15 J. FAM. L. 27, 31 (1976-1977); cf. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816, 841 nA4 (1977) (in dispute over custody of foster children, state, foster
parents, and natural parents share guardianship responsibilities for children and none
speak exclusively for children).
Parents' misperceptions about their children's reactions to divorce are indicated in
the accounts of therapists who counseled divorcing families: "Parents who had initiated
the divorce generally perceived the children as relatively intact, and wanted these per-
ceptions confirmed by us. Similarly, parents who felt injured or abandoned saw their
children as more troubled and damaged by the divorce process and wanted confirmation
for these contrary perceptions." Divorce Counseling, supra note 23, at 11.
35. Berdon, supra note 5, at 159; Inker & Perretta, supra note 7, at 115.
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the court to the child is reflected in the "best interests of the child"
standard for custody adjudications;36 this responsibility has been in-
terpreted by some to mandate protection of the child from "the ri-
gors of adversary proceedings"37 and thus to preclude separate legal rep-
resentation for the child. 38
Yet without separate representation for the child, the court may
neglect important interests of the child in both the outcome and the
process of the proceeding. Because the best interests standard is a
general principle or statement of values rather than a precise test, it
has been criticized for providing "no indication of the degree of at-
tention paid to the child's needs" in application,39 for reducing ju-
dicial opinions to "amorphous platitudes or generalizations, '40 and
for leaving the custody decision essentially indeterminate.41 These
weaknesses are mirrored in the wide discretion of the trial judge,42
36. With variations as to specific factors, as of 1975, 31 jurisdictions appeared to
have had statutes establishing the "best interests of the child" as the standard for divorce
custody adjudications. Others had variations on parental fault or unfitness presumptions.
Mnookin, supra note 6, at 266 n.45. The standard developed in two stages as a re-
sponse to the father's absolute right of custody. Developed in Roman law and English
feudal law and absorbed into common law in the United States, the father's ab-
solute right rested primarily on his guardianship of land and property interests. Derdeyn,
Child Custody Contests in Historical Perspective, 133 AI. J. PSYCH. 1369, 1369-70 (1976);
Inker & Perretta, supra note 7, at 109. As the conception of children evolved from that
of chattel to that of precious and impressionable beings, C. LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS
WORLD: THE FA ImY BESEIGED 4-5 (1977); Skolnick, The Limits of Childhood: Conceptions
of Child Development and Social Context, 39 LAWi & CONTEMP. PROB. 38, 48 (1975), the
courts first responded by articulating paternal duties to the child. Derdeyn, supra at
1369. The parens patriae doctrine, which developed in the seventeenth century, allowed
the Chancery Court to assume child-protective functions and later to deny custody to an
unfit father. Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of "Parens Patriae,"
22 S.C.L. REv. 147, 166, 178-81 (1970); Foster & Freed, Child Custody (pt. 1), 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 423, 423-24 (1964). Nevertheless, a presumption for the father survived in this country
until well into the twentieth century. Derdeyn, supra at 1370.
In the second stage, the best interests standard developed to establish equal rights
between parents in theory, while favoring the mother in practice through simultaneous
development of the "tender years" doctrine that, absent proof of maternal unfitness,
younger children need to be with their mother. Foster & Freed, supra at 425; Kram &
Frank, The Future of "Tender Years," 1976 TRIAL 14.
37. Note, supra note 7, at 920.
38. E.g., Leigh v. Aiken, 54 Ala. App. 620, 625, 311 So. 2d 444, 448-49 (1975); Robin
v. Robin, 45 III. App. 3d 365, 373-74 (1977) (when child allegedly unaware of proceedings,
abuse of discretion for trial judge to appoint guardian ad litem without evidentiary
showing of need); Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Res-
ervations About Abandoning Youth to their Rights, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 605.
39. Derdeyn, supra note 36, at 1371.
40. Foster S& Freed, supra note 36, at 423.
41. Mnookin, supra note 6, at 249-54 (best interests standard depends on "person-
oriented" rather than on "act-oriented" determinations, on predictions rather than on
past events, and on interdependent factors; all sharply limiting appellate review and
precedential value of individual cases). But see Dembitz, supra note 10, at 1311 (adjudi-
cations of child's welfare must depend largely on past facts).
42. Foster & Freed, supra note 36, at 438; Oster, Custody Proceeding: A Study of
Vague and Indefinite Standards, 5 J. FAMt. L. 21, 23-25 (1965).
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which allows little recourse to appellate review.43 Lacking specific
criteria for his decision and hearing only evidence introduced by
the parents' attorneys, the judge frequently considers relative paren-
tal fitness and interests while applying the best interests standard. 44
Indeed, parental culpability in the divorce has been used as a basis
for custody determinations even where the state has a no-fault divorce
statute.45 Encouraging parents to try to disqualify each other, courts
continue to hear testimony and to make decisions based on judicial
perceptions of unconventional morality or lifestyles, factors that often
have little effect on the parent-child relationship.
46
The child's interests in the process as well as in the outcome of the
adjudication are affected by these difficulties in applying the best in-
terests standard. Without a separate representative for the child, the
judge is not well placed to reduce the rancor of the proceedings. The
judge is restricted to the courtroom and cannot on his own obtain the
facts pertaining particularly to the child's viewpoint. 47 And with
43. Mnookin, supra note 6, at 255-62; Note, Courting Reversal: The Supervisory
Role of State Supreme Courts, 87 YALE L.J. 1191, 1210 & n.86 (1978) (reversal rates signif-
icantly low for family law cases).
44. Foster & Freed, supra note 36, at 441; Note, supra note 7, at 922.
45. Derdeyn, supra note 36, at 1372-73.
46. Berdon, supra note 5, at 157; Inker & Perretta, supra note 7, at 115. But see
Simons v. Simons, 172 Conn. 341, 346 8- n.I (1977) (relationship between parent's emotional
problems, drinking, and leaving home unattended "not irrelevant" to welfare of child;
adverse effect on child to be logically inferred, though may be rebutted by evidence that
child totally unaffected).
47. The child's attorney can be a better factfinder than the judge for several reasons.
(I) The judge usually speaks with the child in chambers, if at all. Although obviously
better than testimony in open court, the interview in chambers is still at best brief and
takes place in an imposing and unfamiliar environment. Attorneys can and do make
efforts to speak to children in surroundings more comfortable to the child. See p. 1161
& note 163 infra. One judge believed he could talk easily with children in chambers,
but stressed that the presence of someone who knew the child, whether it be the child's
attorney or a Family Relations Division officer, helped tremendously in setting the
child at ease. Interview with Hon. Robert Callahan, Judge, Connecticut Superior Court,
in Bridgeport, Connecticut, at 3-4 (Feb. 9, 1978) (transcript on file with Yale Law Journal)
[hereinafter cited without cross reference as judge Callahan]. See note 300 infra (Judges
Berdon and Missal stress help of child's attorney in facilitating judge's interview with
child). If the parents' attorneys are present at the judge's interview with the child, the
child may be even more tense and less willing to be open with the judge.
(2) The child's attorney is an active factfinder. He conducts his own investigation,
seeks out facts that he considers important, and can actively discourage attempts to
introduce evidence or testimony that he considers irrelevant and likely only to increase
the parents' bitterness. See generally p. 1174 and notes 231 & 232 infra.
(3) The child's attorney can usually interview the parents alone and out of court, see
p. 1173 infra, which gives the attorney at least two advantages over the judge who listens
to testimony in court: (a) the child's attorney can talk with and observe the parents
before they have been "coached" by their attorneys, see Damaska, Presentation of Evidence
and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1083, 1094 (1975); and (b) if demeanor is an
important clue to credibility, it is important to observe it outside the formality of the
courtroom, see J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 81 (1949).
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congested calendars and rotating sittings,48 the judge is the last person
one would expect to be able to decide the pace at which the litigation
should proceed. Although reforms have been proposed that do not
involve the appointment of counsel for the child and might even ap-
pear to make such an appointment superfluous, 49 such reforms would
not eliminate the dominance of parental interests, and a judge who
focuses on the parents is not likely to be deterred without a persistent
reminder that the child is not merely an object to be awarded to the
more deserving parent. 50
The law cannot prevent all damage to the child's interests caused
by divorce, since it cannot compel harmonious human relationships.5 1
It can, however, provide a means for reducing the damage by ensur-
ing that the child's interests are not neglected in divorce custody
proceedings. Because the child's interests are significantly affected by
the process and outcome of the custody suit, they merit legal recog-
nition. Because they may differ significantly from those of the par-
48. Superior Court judges in Connecticut, for example, rotate among counties and
among family, jury, civil, and criminal sessions. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 51-181 to 51-
182i (1977) (Conn. Pub. Act 76-436, effective July 1, 1978, amends these sections, but
does not alter their substance). The judge may retain jurisdiction over a family relations
case even after leaving the family court session. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-182(f). Such a
practice is infrequent and burdensome to individual judges. See, e.g., Judge Missal at 4.
49. The proposals include a return to an explicit presumption for one parent,
Ellsworth & Levy, supra note 1, at 202-03 (call for return to presumption for mother);
but see Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 368 A.2d 635, 639-40 (Pa. 1977) (ques-
tioning "legitimacy of a doctrine that is predicated upon traditional or stereotypic roles
of men and women in a marital union"); Bronson, Custody on Appeal, 10 LAW &
CoNTLIM. PROB. 737, 746 (1944) (lack of presumptions makes custody determinations
less determinate, but appropriately so), court-supervised counseling after divorce, Boden-
heimer, The Rights of Children and the Crisis in Custody Litigation: Modification of
Custody In and Out of State, 46 U. CoLo. L. Rlv. 495, 507 (1975), increasing the re-
sponsibilities of the parents' attorneys, Rothenberg, The Lawyer's Role in Child Custody
Disputes, 23 N.Y. COUNTY LAW. ASS'N B. BULL. 95, 99 (1965-1966); but see Berdon,
supra note 5, at 159 (parents' attorneys can never adequately represent child's interests,
which may conflict with parents'); Genden, supra note 7, at 587 (parents' attorneys may
be precluded from fully representing child by prohibition of dual representation by
Code of Professional Responsibility), handling modifications through a panel of experts
and friends, Kubie, Provisions for the Care of Children of Divorced Parents: A New
Legal Instrument, 78 YALE L.J. 1197, 1197-1200 (1964), and techniques to reduce the use
of the adversarial system in custody adjudications, see Kay, A Family Court: The Cali-
fornia Proposal, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 1205, 1205-12 (1968) (calling for comprehensive family
court run on nonadversarial basis).
50. This is common ground for the sources cited in note 7 supra. The irony of the
metaphor of child as the object of a dispute was suggested by Mr. Justice Jackson in
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 541 (1953) (dissenting opinion): "[C]ourts [in custody
suits] are no longer concerned primarily with the proprietary claims of the contestants
for the 'res' before the court, but with the welfare of the 'res' itself."
51. BEYOND THE BEsT INTERESTS, supra note 3, at 50 (law can destroy human rela-
tionships but cannot compel them to develop). The law can, at least through devices
such as visitation decrees, compel the objective preconditions for the continuation of
a parent-child relationship despite opposition from the custodial parent.
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ental parties to the suit and are not protected by the judge without
assistance, they warrant separate legal representation.
II. Definitions of the Role in Theory and Practice
Proponents of legal representation for children in divorce custody
disputes have marshaled a broad range of purposes for the attorney
based on a variety of legal theories. Propelled by competing under-
lying role conceptions, contrasting views have emerged in state statutes
and practice as to the appropriate tasks,52 title, 3 and authority for
the appointment 4 of the child's legal representative. On examination,
however, each of these conceptions falls short of the purpose of the
role and each is abandoned in practice.
A. Advocates versus Factfinders
Should the child's legal representative behave as a lawyer whose
client simply happens to be a child? Or do the special characteristics
of the child and of the custody determination call for legal assistance
of a different sort? These questions suggest a rough division of the
rationales for the child's legal representative and their associated role
descriptions into two groups-the advocates and the factfinders.; 5
52. A survey of state statutes and cases produced the following catalogue of tasks:
to investigate and report; to initiate contempt proceedings; to investigate and cause
witnesses to appear; to introduce evidence and oppose the divorce decree; to be
heard on all aspects; to supervise support; to be present at depositions and inter-
rogatories and to cross examine; . . . to determine legal rights; to advocate welfare;
to advocate best interests; to advocate visitation; to insure support and medical care;
to do all things necessary; to make peremptory strikes; to question witnesses; to argue;
* to recommend to the court what he thinks is in the child's best interests.
Mlyniec, supra note 6, at 8-9 (footnotes omitted).
Another suggested task is surveying and opposing agreements between the parents.
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 552.45 (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.121) (1967) (friend of court may
oppose divorce even though both parents want it); Dissolution of Marriage Act, CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 46-43 (1973) (repealed 1974, see Berdon, supra note 5, at 155 n.19) (man-
datory appointment of child's counsel to investigate custody agreements between parents).
But opposition to the divorce and to custody arrangements desired by both parents may
result in more harm than help to the child. Aftermath, supra note 22, at 35-36 (al-
though no victimless divorces, "a conflict-ridden intact family is more deleterious to
family members than a stable home situation in which parents are divorced"). See also
Divorce Counseling, supra note 23, at 22 (social policy facilitating divorce should be
accompanied by provision of supportive services).
53. See note 8 supra (citing statutes). "Child advocate" is another name frequently
appearing in discussions of this subject, but it will not be used here because overuse
has drained it of content, see B. GROSS & R. GROSS, THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS MOVEMEFNT:
OVERCOMING THE OPPRESSION OF YOUNG PEOPLE 1-10 (1977).
54. See p. 1139 and notes 56, 57 & 62 infra.
55. Inconsistent nomenclature and varied views on the child's preference contribute
to ambiguity in the role conceptions. See p. 1141 & note 71 infra.
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To establish procedural protections for the child in a custody dis-
pute, the advocates draw on due process rights to counsel, 56 the lan-
guage of statutes governing joinder and intervention,57 and analogies
to juvenile court reforms. 58 They generally urge conferral of party
status on the child to clear the way for the full legal advocacy avail-
able to adults.,9 Many statutes explicitly require that the represen-
tative for the child be an attorney;0 0 these statutes appear to contem-
plate that the attorney would call and cross-examine witnesses, argue
motions, and perform other tasks of a traditional trial advocate. 1
56. E.g., Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012, 1027 (5th Cir. 1969) (Rives, J., dissenting);
Berdon, supra note 5, at 161; cf. State v. Wade, 527 P.2d 753, 755 (Or. App. 1974), appeal
dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 423 U.S. 806 (1975) (action for termi-
nation of parental rights). But see Salaices v. Sabraw, 400 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Cal. 1975)
(state court did not violate due process by refusing to permit children and their attorney
to intervene in proceedings to enforce visitation order); Leigh v. Aiken, 54 Ala. App. 620,
311 So. 2d 444 (1975) (due process rights of child not applicable to custody proceedings;
judge assures fundamental fairness).
The constitutional argument has theoretical flaws. The argument's principal bulwark,
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), did not purport to do more than accord due process pro-
tections to minors in criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings. Extensions to civil de-
terminations have met with little success. See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976)
(no constitutional right to counsel in court-martial because not criminal proceeding);
United States v. Holmes, 387 F.2d 781 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 936 (1968)
(Gault protections restricted to delinquency proceedings); Madera v. Board of Educ., 386
F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968) (no right to counsel at pre-
liminary conference before school suspension). In addition, Gault and other Supreme
Court decisions furthering the rights of children may be limited to rights claimed by
children in concert, not in conflict, with their parents. J. Goldstein, On Being Adult
and Being An Adult in Secular Law, 105 DAEDALUS 69, 74 (1976).
57. Note, supra note 7, at 928 (proposals for separate counsel based on state statutes
governing joinder and interpleading); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(i) (joinder of person
so situated that disposition in his absence may "as a practical matter impair or impede
his ability to protect that interest"); id. 24(a)(2) (permissive intervention by party not
adequately represented by existing parties).
58. The major analogy stems from Gault. See note 56 supra. Other analogies have
been drawn to provision of counsel in neglect, probate, and personal injury actions, and
also for medical treatment without parental consent. See Note, supra note 7, at 930.
59. See, e.g., BEYOND THE BESr INTERESTS, supra note 3. at 65; Berdon, supra note 5, at
155-56; Holman & Noland, Agreement and Arbitration: Relief to Over-litigation in Do-
mestic Relations Disputes in Washington, 12 WILLAMETTE L.J. 527, 543 (1976).
60. See note 8 supra. Several authorities conclude that a child should have counsel
because a guardian ad litem would not provide as active and effective protection. UNIFORM
MARRIAGE AND DIvORcE Acr § 310, comment, reprinted in 5 FAm. L.Q. 205, 235 (1971);
Shepherd, Solomon's Sword: Adjudication of Child Custody Questions, 8 U. RICH. L. REv.
151, 178 (1974).
If the rationale for representation rests on constitutional due process protections, any-
thing other than full legal counsel would fall short of the required guarantees. See
Bersoff, supra note 34, at 38 n.38 (citing cases); cf. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,
744, rehearing denied, 388 U.S. 924 (1967) (on criminal appeal counsel must act as active
advocate, not amicus curiae); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1099 (E.D. Wis.
1972) (appointment of guardian ad litem cannot satisfy constitutional requirement of rep-
resentative counsel in civil commitment proceedings).
61. E.g., Berdon, supra note 5, at 166.
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The contrasting theory relies on the inherent powers of the court
to protect the child. 62 The child would receive neither the party status
nor the legal representation due a party; instead, the court would
appoint an assistant to help discover and protect the child's interests
in the pending litigation. Called by some a guardian ad litem03-
a term with a large number of meanings, including that of any legal
representative for a child for the duration of a suit0 4-the nonadvo-
62. Genden, supra note 7, at 584-86; Speca & Wehrman, Protecting the Rights of
Children in Divorce Cases in Missouri, 38 U. Mo. K.C.L. REv. 1, 25-38 (1969). The Cali-
fornia Governor's Commission on the Family concluded that although the state courts
probably possess inherent power to appoint guardians ad litem in custody cases, this
power should be codified for purposes of clarity and certainty. Childs, Rights of the
Legally Disadvantaged In Adoption and Child Custody Matters, 53 WOMEN LAW. J.
50, 54 (1967). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c) (court may "appoint a guardian ad litem
for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented in an action").
63. See note 8 supra (citing statutes).
Observers have commented that the guardian ad litem has more restricted powers
and duties than counsel, which makes the guardian ad litem appear like a factfinder;
generally, however, commentators have not precisely distinguished the roles. See Derdeyn,
supra note 36, at 1374; Note, supra note 7, at 924-25, 949. Thus, commentary to the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act calls for appointment of counsel rather than a
guardian ad litem for the child. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Aar § 310 & comment,
reprinted in 5 FAMr. L.Q. 205 (1971). Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Robert Hansen
rejected the role of factfinding investigator but continues to call the alternative a guard-
ian ad litem. Schipper v. Schipper, 96 Wis. 2d 303, 313, 174 N.W.2d 474, 482 (1970)
(Hansen, J., concurring).
64. At common law, court rulings against persons such as infants or mentally re-
tarded individuals were void unless a guardian ad litem had been present to protect their
personal interests against adverse judicial rulings. J. WOERNER, A TREATISE ON THE
AMERICAN LAW OF GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS AND PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND § 1 (1897).
At least three distinct uses of the term now exist. The first is the historical use. A
competent person-not necessarily a lawyer-who provided the "dispositive quality of
mind" to guard a child's property or financial interests during a specific litigation,
the traditional guardian ad litem was not entrusted with the care or custody of the
child, with supervising the child's estate, nor with conducting the suit except under
the judge's supervision. Originally, the guardian ad litem only protected an infant de-
fendant while a "prochein and" or "next friend" prosecuted a complaint for an infant
plaintiff, but this distinction has eroded over time. 45 IowA L. REv. 376, 379 (1960).
The second meaning of the term emerged with the advent of independent repre-
sentation for children in custody suits arising from neglect, abuse, delinquency, and
divorce proceedings. Even when a lawyer is appointed in this role, he is not to take
an adversarial role but to act as an impartial investigator for the court. Fraser, Inde-
pendent Representation for the Abused and Neglected Child: The Guardian ad Litem,
13 CAL. W.L. REV. 16, 28 (1976).
The third meaning of the term is that of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which
has rejected the investigative function but still uses the term "guardian ad litem" to
denote the legal advocate for the child. Schipper v. Schipper, 96 Wis. 2d 303, 313, 174
N.W.2d 474, 482 (1970) (Hansen, J., concurring); see, e.g., Hansen, The Role and Rights
of Children in Divorce Actions, 6 J. FAM. L. 1, 7-9 (1966) (discussion by leading ju-
dicial force behind Wisconsin practice); Podell, supra note 7, at 108.
The term also bears the connotation of guardianship generally, by which one person
is entrusted with making decisions for another. In the custody context, this sense of
"guardian" would require reallocation of the custody decision from the judge to the
child's representative, a result rejected by commentators. Genden, supra note 7, at 588-89.
But cf. BEYOND THE BrST INTERESTS, supra note 3, at 66-67 (psychologically determined
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cate representative for the child is more properly denominated a fact-
finder. His principal role is that of impartial investigator;15 his prin-
cipal task is to "insure that all considerations regarding the best
interests of the child will have been brought to the Court's attention."' 0
Rather than advocate a particular placement decision, the factfinder
submits a report to the judge; he does not necessarily participate in
the trial.67
The lines between the role conceptions become sharpest in dis-
cussions of the import for the child's legal representative of a child's ex-
pressed preference for one parent.0 8 One school holds that the child's
preference is but one fact to be found,69 while the other maintains
that without full advocacy of the preference there would be little
reason to have a child's representative at all.70 Yet there is a range of
intermediate views on how the representative should treat the child's
preference, 71 a range that suggests a continuum of roles rather than
the extremes of advocate and factfinder. Delineations between the
roles also become blurred when an advocate represents a child with
a vacillating preference or when a factfinder reports facts that recom-
mend one parent over the other.
Underlying both roles is a limited conception of legal representa-
"least detrimental alternative" should prevail). See also Kindregan, Conflict of Interest and
the Lawyer in Civil Practice, 10 VAL. U.L. REV. 423, 432 (1976) ("hydra-headed" role
of guardian ad litem poses problem for attorney, who must advise court but also advance
best interests of client). The term "guardian ad litem" will not be used for the remainder
of this Note except when employed by a quoted source.
65. Ky. REv. STAT. § 403.090 (Supp. 1976) (investigate and report); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 215, § 56A (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1977) (same); Genden, supra note 7, at 593,
595 (neutral factfinding rather than advocacy may be appropriate function to protect
child's interests).
66. Inker & Perretta, supra note 7, at 120.
67. Holman 9- Noland, supra note 59, at 543.
68. See Siegel & Hurley, The Role of the Child's Preference in Custody Proceedings,
11 FAlu. L.Q. 1, 13 (1977).
69. See, e.g., Genden, supra note 7, at 589.
70. Mlyniec, supra note 6, at 16.
71. One intermediate view suggests that the child's preference should be influential
but not controlling in the representation. Bersoff, supra note 34, at 40 (child's preference
should be presumptively but rebuttably conclusive in custody determination). This po-
sition reflects a broader movement to reverse the presumption of incompetency and al-
low children to make choices concerning their own lives. Rodham, Children Under the
Law, 43 HARv. EDuc. REv. 487, 508 (1973) (presumption of child's mental incompetency
to make choices should be reversed as per Justice Douglas's dissent in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241-46 (1972)); Tribe, Childhood, Suspect Classifications and Con-
clusive Presumptions: Three Linked Riddles, 39 LAw & CONTEMNP. PROB. 8, 32 (1975)
(child must have opportunity "to rebut any implied or asserted age-based incapacity").
Another view posits that the weight of the child's preference should increase with the
child's age. Cf. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 30-127, 74-107 (Supp. 1977) (child 14 years or older
should have right to select parent unless selected individual is unfit).
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tion.7 2 Both roles focus on the position to be presented to the court.
Neither addresses the needs of a child during the period of litigation.73
These deficiencies are readily visible in the experiences of attorneys
who latch onto the role conceptions for theoretical definition but
abandon them when actually representing children.
B. The Roles in Practice
To obtain a picture of the roles adopted by practitioners, a study
was initiated in September 1977. The study collected and analyzed
the experiences of attorneys appointed under Connecticut law74 to
represent children in contested custody or related disputes following
divorce. The clerks of the New Haven County and Hartford County
Superior Courts supplied the names of eighteen attorneys who had
received appointments to represent children in divorce suits.7 3 These
attorneys included virtually every Hartford and New Haven attorney
who had been or was receiving appointments as counsel for the child
72. Functions of a legal representative include counseling, negotiation, conciliation,
private legislation, and private adjudication, as well as investigation and advocacy. V.
COUNTRYMAN, T. FINMAN & T. SCHNEYER, THE LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIErY 229-30 (1976);
H. O'GORMAN, LAWYERS AND MATRIMONIAL CASES: A STUDY OF INFORWMAL PRESSURE IN
PRIVATE PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 119-51 (1963) (study of attorney's role in divorce actions).
73. See p. 1131 supra.
74. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46-43 (1977):
Counsel for minor children. Duties. At any time after tile return day of a com-
plaint under section 46-36, if there is a minor child or minor children of the parties,
or either of them, the court may, if the court deems it to be in the best interests
of the child or children to appoint counsel for such child or children, on its own
motion, or at the request of either of the parties or of the legal guardian of any
such child or at the request of any such child who is of sufficient age and capable
of making an intelligent request, appoint counsel for such child or children. Such
counsel may also be appointed on the motion of the court or on the request of any
such person in any case before said court when the court finds that the custody,
care, education, visitation or support of a minor child or children- is in actual con-
troversy, provided the court shall not be precluded from making any order relative
to a matter in controversy prior to the appointment of counsel where it finds im-
mediate action necessary in the best interests of any such child. Any such counsel
shall be heard upon all matters pertaining to the interests of such child or children,
including the custody, care, stlpport, education and visitation of the child or children
so long as the court deems such representation to be in the best interests of the
child or children.
In Connecticut, the appointment may be initiated with a motion by an attorney for
a parent, a recommendation of the Family Relations Division or other concerned observer,
or on the judge's own action. The judge who appoints counsel does not necessarily
hear the case when it returns to court due to the rotation of judges. See note 48 supra.
75. The interviews with Hartford County attorneys indicated no important differences
between the experiences of attorneys in the two counties; the only reported difference, de-
termined by comparing the responses of both groups of attorneys to 45 factors, was the
greater cooperation between attorneys and the Family Relations Division in Hartford
County as compared with New Haven County.
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in divorce-related disputes when the study began.76 They represented
a broad range of practices and styles.77 To the extent that conditions
may vary elsewhere,78 the experiences of these lawyers may not be
generalizable; there seems little to indicate, however, that the study
has not addressed most of the problems and issues that would confront
an attorney representing a child in a divorce custody suit under a no-
fault divorce statute in any state.
The interviews are used in two ways in the Note: to examine the
models and criticisms of child representation that have appeared in
theoretical discussions on divorce custody, and to provide insights
from practice in support of a set of normative principles proposed in
this Note.
A "focused" 7 9 interviewing technique was employed with each at-
torney. 0 After a few direct questions about the attorney's background,
76. The study used the list of 14 attorneys from New Haven County who had ex-
pressed to the Clerk their willingness to receive appointments for child representation
in divorce suits by the time the study was initiated. Similarly, the names of the four
Hartford County attorneys who had received nearly all such appointments at that time
were obtained from the Hartford County Clerk. Comprising not a sample but virtually
the entire population of attorneys receiving these appointments, the study reviews the
general experience with child representation since it began in 1973 in these two counties
of Connecticut.
77. The attorneys' practices ranged from public legal assistance to criminal, personal
injury, and general practice; their experience as lawyers ranged from 1% to 30 years,
with most having worked for less than 10 years. Some worked as solo practitioners, others
as partners and associates in small firms, and others as members of legal assistance or-
ganizations.
78. The one unusual aspect of the experience of these attorneys was their exposure
to Yale University. The attorneys' responses to psychological experts, described in pp.
1180-83 infra, undoubtedly reflect the presence of the Yale Child Study Center in the
community.
79. This study employed
the focused interview, which is unstandardized in the sense that the wording of
questions is not specified but where there is, nonetheless, a definite focus on a
topic germane to the research. The interviewer comes to the respondent with a list
of topics derived from a preliminary consideration of the research problem and then
directs his questioning in a way which establishes the credibility of the information
imparted.
J. HUGHES, SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS: fETHODS OF DiscovERY 146 (1976).
80. The interviewing guide used by the authors in interviewing included topics to
be covered rather than exact questions to be asked. See Appendix A. All of the inter-
views took place in the office of the interviewee and lasted between one and three
hours. With two exceptions, the interviews were tape-recorded and later transcribed
verbatim. For the two interviewees who did not allow tape-recording, notes were taken
and immediately typed in transcript form. In general, the inhibition potentially caused
by the presence of a tape recorder was outweighed by the value for analysis of verbatim
accounts.
Transcriptions of conversations introduced some problems. In this Note, punctuation
has been added, even though it may be arbitrary. When oral expression is transcribed,
it can seem incoherent and ungrammatical. Nevertheless, the authors concluded that it
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general practice, and reasons for representing children,8 ' the attorney
was asked to recount chronologically his involvement in individual
cases. This interviewing technique was chosen in order to elicit in-
formation on the problems and tasks that each attorney considered
important. Although the interviewers asked the attorneys to clarify
or to be more specific, each attorney established the terminology and
framework for describing his8 2 experiences. After they described the
chronological development of each case, attorneys were asked direct
questions to elicit information not raised in their recitals.8 3 In this
manner, the interviewers obtained the attorneys' own perceptions or
priorities and also specific information for comparison among at-
torneys.8 4
was more important to enable the reader to draw his own interpretations and conclu-
sions than to "fix" the language for print.
To preserve the promise of confidentiality given the attorneys, they will be referred
to only by code initials A through R, which have been assigned randomly. Attorneys'
remarks are cited by code initial and transcript page number, e.g., "Attorney A at 20."
Although the accuracy of citations has been carefully checked by the Editors of the
Yale Law Journal, the transcripts themselves are confidential and thus are not available
to the public.
81. Most of the attorneys were young and became involved in child representation
to build a practice. Some got involved because they enjoyed working with children or
as an extension of a specialty in domestic relations practice. Three reported that they
had represented children as a favor to a judge who had requested their help in a specific
case. Attorney I at 2; Attorney M at 7; Attorney R at I. Two said that they considered
the job to be a pro bono assignment. Attorney F at 34; Attorney H at 1. For others
it became one when they were not paid or were only partially paid. The attorney
for the child is permitted to submit a bill for reasonable fees to the court for an
order of payment by one or both parties; in Connecticut practice the judicial de-
partment may be billed $100 for the services of a legal representative for any child
who has received state aid. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46-59 (1977). The attorneys unanimously
reported that they billed and received less in fees than they would normally charge
for the hours put into these cases.
82. To preserve confidentiality, the masculine pronoun is used throughout in ref-
erence to interviewed attorneys and their child clients. Few differences between male
and female attorneys appeared in the study.
83. The attorneys were asked to contrast their role as child's attorney in divorce
custody suits to the role of attorney for a parent in other such cases. In addition,
attorneys were asked to compare lawyering for the child in divorce custody litigation
to any representation they may have done of children in delinquency, neglect, or abuse
proceedings. See Appendix A.
84. There is inevitably some disjuncture between what attorneys said they did and
what they actually did. The possibility of exaggeration and of self-serving statements
is shown in Project, The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce: An Em-
pirical Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104, 143-46 (1976), where attorneys and their clients were
found to disagree as to number and length of attorney-client conversations. Here, the
willingness of attorneys to describe their confusion and their problems with the role
of counsel for the child would seem to compensate for this tendency.
To obtain additional perspectives on the role and performance of attorneys for the
child, four Superior Court judges (in Connecticut all family relations matters are heard
in countywide superior courts, see CONN. GEN STAT. §§ 51-182a, -182c (1977)), who have
a range of views on the appointment of counsel for the child, were interviewed, as
were the Assistant Clerk and the Supervisor of the Family Relations Division of the
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Unless an attorney introduced the thought himself, he was never
asked to provide a conceptual model or label for his role. More than
half the attorneys volunteered a theoretical label for their role,8 5 yet
New Haven Superior Court. The responses of these individuals and of the attorneys
are helpful in identifying the troublesome issues in the area, but not in evaluating
individual conduct in specific cases.
85. Six attorneys identified themselves as factfinders. Attorney B explained that
his job was to get information for the judge, not to act as an advocate. Attorney B at
27, 56. Attorney D said that he was to provide "objective input into the decisionmaking
process and to rivet the attention of the parties and the court to the appropriate focal
point." Attorney D at 26. Attorney E distinguished himself from a social worker, but
emphasized that his job entailed keeping an open mind and bringing all relevant evi-
dence to the court. Attorney E at 8, 27. Describing a similar function, Attorney Q
likened his role to that of a social worker who investigates for the judge and finds
any problems experienced by the children. Attorney Q at 38. Attorney H said that his
job was to get all the facts and that he was not to take sides. Attorney H at 3. At-
torney R explained that he was an arm of the court responsible for obtaining all pos-
sible information and for bringing out facts in cross-examination at trial. Attorney .R
at 18, 20, 26. He stressed that he would not decide on a position to advocate until
all evidence had been given at trial; he would then file a report with recommendations
to the judge. Id. at 18, 33, 87.
The self-styled advocates included Attorney A, who considered himself ethically obliged
to withdraw from a case should he disagree with the child's position. Attorney A at 17.
Attorney I said his responsibility was to conduct the litigation based on his perception
of the child's preference. Attorney I at 9, 11. Attorney K stated that he rarely opposed
a child's preference and that where a child was too young to express a preference the
lawyer's appointment should be as guardian ad litem rather than attorney for the child.
Attorney K at 9, 15. Attorney L said that he would advocate what the child wanted,
except that with very young children he would advocate the recommendation of an ex-
pert. To children old enough to understand, he explained his job as telling the court
what they wanted. Attorney L at 15, 19, 23. Attorney M would represent the child as
he would any other client. Attorney M at 11.
Attorney C labeled himself a "child advocate" because he felt his job was to report
the child's views to the judge, but his explanation of the role did not include examining
witnesses at trial but only conducting an independent pretrial investigation. Attorney C
at 2-5. Attorney 0 stressed that he was not a social work investigator, but rather the
child's "mouthpiece" to the court. Attorney 0 at 18-19, 45, 51. These two attorneys
could be interpreted as factfinders with a special obligation to ascertain and report
the child's preference.
Three attorneys described hybrid role conceptions. Attorney F viewed himself as both
advocate and protector: he would find out what the child wanted but would protect
the child from consequences the child could not perceive or verbalize. The attorney
planned to couch his reports neutrally and take cues from individual judges as to whether
active advocacy of the child's viewpoint would be well received. Attorney F at 7-8, 25,
27, 34. As a factfinder, Attorney G included in his role protection of the child's rights
at trial by active cross-examination of witnesses. Attorney G at 4, 10. Attorney J iden-
tified himself as advocate, investigator, protector, and witness. Attorney J at 9, 10, 14.
The contribution of personal judgment to resolving the child's problem was empha-
sized by two attorneys. One suggested that he was a "parent" with legal training who
explained the situation to the child and protected him by making judgments as he
would for his own child. This attorney also stressed thorough investigation and active
advocacy should the case come to trial. Attorney N at 3, 11, 14, 17, 18, 26. Another
lawyer said that his duty was to provide an opinion to the court and to protect in-
terests not perceived by the child himself. Attorney P at 2, 5. Thus 11 attorneys iden-
tified themselves as either advocates or factfinders, five described variations on these
two role conceptions, and two introduced specific guardianship elements by supplying
personal judgment in the role.
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every one of these attorneys took on responsibilities inconsistent with
his characterization. In each situation the attorneys were able to ex-
plain how their choice of action made sense and served some other
value in representing the child. The abstract conceptions of the role
thus had only partial and sometimes misleading implications for
practice.
1. The Advocates
A number of attorneys identified their role as advocate for the
children. They explained that this meant representing these clients
as they would represent any adult client: 6 the child's desires should
direct the attorney's investigation and arguments in the case. Yet each
of these attorneys also reported instances in which he felt compelled
to serve child-protective functions, even if the result was contrary to
the expressed view of the child. More than courtroom advocates, these
attorneys also counseled the parents and attended to the child's emo-
tional needs during the litigation.
One attorney identified himself as an advocate for the child's per-
ceptions and desires because "[i]f it's going to be an adversary sys-
tem, then every party should have his own representation."8' 7 Ad-
mitting that the Connecticut statute authorizing child representation
in divorce custody suits is "very ambiguous" and subject to conflicting
interpretations, this attorney argued that the child's counsel should
file motions, draft stipulations, and take appeals if necessary to achieve
the child's goals.88 According to this attorney, handling a case on be-
half of the child means "that one ought never to recommend some-
thing contrary to the expressed wishes of a client."8' 9 He followed
this philosophy even with a thirteen-year-old client who failed to pro-
vide what he considered "terribly good reasons" 90 for wishing to avoid
visitation with the noncustodial parent.91 The attorney cross-examined
86. E.g., Attorney I at 11, 23, 26.
87. Attorney K at 45.
88. "I've always acted as if I have that authority and I do do it. I regularly in
these cases file motions and take part in the proceedings..... I've played an active
role in the trial of the case on behalf of the child." Id. at 13.
89. Id. at 22.
90. Id. at 25.
91. Nobody offered any reasons that satisfied me, but I was satisfied after talking
at great length with the child ... [that] that's what he really wanted and he was
unambiguous and unambivalent about it. . . . [A]lthough he also was a rather im-
mature 13-year old, he was in a position to express in an intelligent and informed
way what he wanted-not so intelligent, but at least cogent. So we-I think very
early in the case-took the position that we should support the child's express wishes.
Id. at 26.
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witnesses at the hearing, arranged for and attended an interview in
chambers between the child and the judge, and submitted an argu-
mentative report with a recommendation that supported the child's
expressed wish.
9 2
In spite of his philosophy, the attorney described a case in which
he advocated a position exactly contrary to the child's expressed wishes.
Again, the child client did not want to visit with the noncustodial
parent; in fact, the child unequivocally and vehemently communi-
cated to the lawyer that he did not want to be forced to visit. The
attorney felt able to recommend visitation because of what he con-
sidered exceptional circumstances:
It's probably the first case in which I've represented a child and
I took a position contrary to his expressed wishes. I couldn't have
done that conscientiously had I not had the input from the so-
cial worker [who had been working with the family for some time]
that the child really did want to see his father and just didn't want
to be responsible for making that decision.9 3
The attorney also departed from his theoretical role of advocate by
meeting intensively with both parents and counseling them in order
to reach a workable out-of-court settlement.9 4 Contrasting the "vig-
92. Id. at 26-28. The judge adopted verbatim the attorney's recommendation. Id. at
29; see p. 1184 infra (counsel for child's general effectiveness with judges).
In another case, this lawyer's view of his responsibility to advance the views of two
children with different parental preferences led him to override his belief that siblings
should not be separated. Attorney K at 32. His self-conception of advocate led him to
state that
if a child were unable to express a preference, I would ask that I be appointed
guardian ad litem to make it clear that I was not the attorney but that I was pro-
tecting the child's legal interests serving in a guardianship role. I would not accept
appointment as an attorney and then act as a guardian. I think that's a clear role
conflict and I think it's probably unethical.
Id. at 51.
93. Id. at 6-7.
94. In one case, the younger of two children in the custody dispute did not havw a
preference for a custodial parent but did want to stay with the older sibling. The
attorney settled the suit by an agreement giving custody of both children to one parent
and scheduling generous visitation with the other parent in exact terms. Because the
parties remained contentious and unwilling to cooperate fully with each other, the at-
torney continued to monitor the visitation schedule, talk with all parties, and deflect
vengeful behavior by either parent. At one point, he investigated and rejected charges
of neglect made by the noncustodial party. Over time, the attorney discovered that the
younger child developed a strong desire to move to the custody of the noncustodial
parent. The attorney discussed the situation with the parties and their attorneys and
drafted stipulations to effect the change but still provide for ample visitation with both
parents and between siblings. The attorney concluded that this satisfied the desires of
the younger child and helped to relax tension between the parties, thus eliminating the
need for outside monitoring. Id. at 32-36.
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orous" advocacy of the parents' attorneys with his own role, the at-
torney concluded: "[T]he child's attorney plays the most important
part because very often the parties are not that far apart when a
child's attorney is appointed and what's really necessary is for some-
one ... to talk with all of the lawyers and to talk with the parties."0 5
To call this attorney an advocate would not capture the variety of
functions he performed. Many of his actions were designed to facili-
tate understanding and acceptance between the parties and to provide
time for a child to form a decision.
Another attorney characterized his role as advocate for the child's
viewpoint because he perceived that this would straighten out the
"mix-up of loyalties" that might prevent the attorneys for the parents
from fully representing their clients.96 Therefore, he conceived of the
child's attorney as an active advocate, gathering evidence, formulating
arguments, seeking relief, and appealing the decision if necessary. 7
This attorney asserted, with some qualifications, that the child's own
perceptions and desires should guide the attorney.98
Yet in no case he described did the attorney discuss or discern
the child's custodial preference. Two cases involved children who
were seven- and six-years old, respectively. In both instances, the at-
torney chose not to meet with the children at all because he assumed
that the sessions would not be very useful to him. He decided to
rely on observations of the children offered by the parents and by
psychologists who had been hired to form a recommendation in one
of the cases.99 When the attorney discovered that the five-year old in
a third case "didn't know the case was going on," he decided that "I
wasn't about to tell him. I didn't see any good in that."' 00
Unlike his expressed self-concept as advocate for the child's point
of view, this attorney's tactics in particular cases indicate that his
chief purpose was to improve the process of decisionmaking by chang-
ing the pace of the litigation and by according concern and considera-
tion to all involved.10' He spent a great amount of time with the
95. Id. at 23.
96. Attorney M at 10.
97. Id. at I1, 13, 22.
98. He explained:
If I were representing an eight-year old and I thought the kid was fairly together,
but wanted A and I thought that B was probably better but that A wasn't off the
wall, I would probably subdue my attraction for B and basically treat him like an
adult client, within reason, and pitch for A.
Id. at 12.
99. Id. at 14, 27.
100. Id. at 9.
101. One case had been delayed intentionally by one party. The attorney realized
that the lack of a report by a psychological expert was the chief obstacle to bringing
1148
Vol. 87: 1126, 1978
Lawyering for the Child
parties to two suits; he explained that he eventually settled both cases
by concentrating on a resolution in which the "losing parent" would
not feel "terribly embittered, vilified." He said that he tried to en-
sure that both sides in each case
had an opportunity to bring out their point of view and have
their side fully explored. If the whole thing goes down in a way
which inspires their confidence and sense of fairness, and mo-
tivated by a wish to do the right thing for the child, I think
they can come to peace.10 2
This attorney's definition of his role as advocate for the child does not
capture his flexibility in practice: "I try to find the most constructive
role I can play .... I try to get the most information, check both the
parents and the people they wanted me to check, look at court records,
and try to get the full picture . . .103
A third attorney defined himself as an advocate for the child and
stressed that he made frequent and early motions in order to make
his presence felt by the parents and their attorneys. 04 Yet this at-
torney also expressed doubt about the reliability of a child's choice
of custodial parent and was concerned that psychological damage
might result if the child were forced to choose between parents. 0 5
The attorney admitted that he would not know whether to advocate
even an unequivocal preference of a child if it conflicted with his
own "objective" determination that the other parent would be bet-
ter.106 While maintaining the importance of advocacy, this attorney
rhetorically retreated to the role of impartial investigator:
I guess the presumption is that you gather facts hoping that the
more facts the court has the more the court will be able to make
an intelligent decision, and if the court makes an intelligent de-
cision then your clients will be benefited somehow, since the
children are your clients.'
0 7
the case to court, so he hired an expert and pressured him to meet an immediate dead-
line and thus permit the case to come to trial quickly. Id. at 15.
In another case, the attorney determined that the parent seeking to modify existing
visitation arrangements in fact intended to use this tactic as a first step toward modifying
custody. The child's attorney saw no reason to favor a change in custody and communi-
cated to the parties that he would oppose strategic use of the visitation issue because
the immediate contest and future consequences could be disadvantageous to the child.
After consulting with a psychologist who had evaluated the child, the attorney decided
to counter the tactic of the moving party by slowing down the processing of the case.
Id. at 27-28.
102. Id. at 13.
103. Id. at 28.
104. Attorney I at 19-20.
105. Id. at 32, 35, 37.
106. Id. at 32, 42.
107. Id. at 42.
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In specific cases, this attorney explained his efforts to protect the in-
terests of the children during the process of the litigation-interests
that the children were not able to express themselves. 108
Attorneys who identified themselves as advocates had clear con-
ceptions of that role. An advocate should work to persuade the court
to follow the client's preference by making motions, asserting argu-
ments, drawing stipulations, and taking appeals if necessary. An ad-
vocate should help the adversary process by freeing parents' lawyers
to give their own clients undiluted loyalty.100 In practice, however,
these attorneys performed in ways not suggested by their own role
conceptions. They ignored, evaluated, or rejected the preference of
the child; they worked to gather all available facts and sometimes
did not advance a position to the court; they mediated between and
counseled parents and tried to help them develop realistic perspec-
tives. By responding to the needs of children in the process as well
as in the outcome of adjudications, these attorneys may have advanced
the interests of their clients more than would an attorney who limits
himself to advocacy.
2. The Factfinders
Attorneys who identified their principal task as finding facts to
help the judge also showed that, in particular situations, they felt it
was necessary to take on advocacy, counseling, and mediating respon-
sibilities. One attorney explained that his role was neither to ad-
vocate the child's preference nor to write a recommendation, "but
to make sure that the court has all the facts available that I can
drudge up."1 0 He regarded as his most important accomplishment
his success in one case in compensating for the failure of the parents'
attorneys to uncover information that was seriously damaging to one
party."' As a factfinder, he investigated allegations of abuse,"12 tracked
down police records of a mother's boyfriend,"13 and questioned neigh-
108. In one case, this attorney opposed motions by the parents' attorneys to delay
the proceedings because he concluded that the children would be better off without
prolonging the period of uncertainty. rd. at 26.
109. Attorney M observed that an attorney for a parent might feel pressure to "trim"
his advocacy for his client in order to consider the child's interests; when the child had
a lawyer, the parent's attorney could act as a full adversary. Attorney M at 9-10, 23.
See also p. 1134 & note 35 supra.
110. Attorney H at 3; see id. at 5 ("I don't think that too much information is
ever bad. I won't come up with a recommendation.")
111. Id. at 6.
112. Id. at 2.
113. Id. at 5.
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bors to check out the stories given by both sides.114 Yet in each case
he described, the attorney took steps to work out short-term problems
and to avoid bringing issues to court. Once in court, he shaped the
facts to persuade the judge to take a particular point of view. He
acted in particular situations to minimize conflict, not simply to ex-
pose all relevant facts.
He attempted in one case to lessen the disruption in the children's
lives and to lay a foundation for further settlement by negotiating
an agreement that the children not be moved from the pendente lite
custody arrangement until after the end of the school year.115 In an-
other suit, he had decided that the mother would be the better cus-
todial parent before the father told him that the mother was a les-
bian. The mother's attorney would not deny this charge, but neither
would he present it to the judge. Although the child's attorney ac-
knowledged this to be a fact relevant to the custody decision and con-
sidered himself a factfinder for the court, he decided not to present
it to the judge."" He felt that exposing the mother's lesbianism in
open court would hurt the children's relationship with her. More-
over, settlement was still possible, for the father had indicated that
he would drop his motion for custody if he were satisfied that the
mother's sexual preference would not harm the children. Rather than
disclosing an important fact to the court, therefore, this "factfinder"
obtained a postponement from the judge and arranged to have the
mother evaluated by a specialist in sexual disorders. Upon the ex-
pert's determination that the mother was mature and could manage
the situation without adversely affecting the children, the parties
agreed to settle.
117
Another attorney identified himself as an investigator in a deliberate
rejection of the lawyer's usual role of advocate:
I really don't seem to feel [an attorney-client relationship] when
I am with the kids. I see myself as a social worker, just trying to
see if there are any problems, and if there are .any problems to
see that they are expressed and brought to the attention of the
court.1 18
114. Id. at 7.
115. Id. at 5.
116. Id. at 6.
117. Id. In other cases, this attorney described tactics typical of an advocate. He
planned to move to suppress a Family Relations report in one case because he disagreed
with its recommendation and criticized its use of hearsay. Id. at 7. Preparing for a
hearing in another case, he planned to present a report to the judge that evaluated
the children's preferences and took a position against one party because of an uncon-
ventional lifestyle. Id. at 5.
118. Attorney Q at 38.
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In one instance, when the judge asked him to determine whether the
pendente lite orders had been violated by the parties, he did not restrict
himself to ascertaining that fact."19 The attorney also made his own
judgments based on his perception of what the children's interests
were, what facts he should uncover, and how extensive an investiga-
tion he should undertake. In two cases involving motions to modify
existing custody arrangements, the attorney posed for himself a thresh-
old question: was there any substance to an allegation against the
existing custodian that would warrant moving the children? Barring
a legitimate objection to the prevailing living arrangements, he said
he would oppose the disruption of a move even if the alternative
placement afforded better financial or educational opportunities. 12
Unlike an impartial factfinder, the attorney made his own judgment,
based in part on the children's preferences, and advocated a specific
position before the court.
The attorney who restricted his role most completely to investi-
gation out of court expressed the greatest dissatisfaction with his con-
tribution to the child's welfare. Identifying his function as reporting
to the judge the child's preference and other information obtained
from people who knew the child, this attorney specified that his
role did not include discussion with the attorneys for the parents
or consultation with the Family Relations Division of the court.'2 ' He
explained that it was not his job to set the court date, nor did he
call or cross-examine witnesses at a hearing.
-' 22
In the first case he handled, this attorney submitted his report to
the judge after spending time with the eight-year-old client and in-
terviewing professionals and relatives who knew the family and the
child. He had a schedule conflict with the date set for the trial but
did not move for a continuance or postponement. Although the judge's
decree was contrary to the recommendation of the attorney for the
child and the losing party filed an appeal, the child's attorney was
uncertain whether he could or ought to join the appeal. Because the
judge advised him that his role was over and he should collect his
fees, he did not participate further in the case,123 a decision he later
came to regret.
24
119. Id. at 35-36.
120. Id. at 10-13, 18-23 (curtailed investigation without meeting wealthier noncus-
todial parent after determining there was no problem with existing arrangement); id.
at 43-45 (opposed motion by noncustodial parent who promised greater educational op-
portunities because no change in circumstances warranted moving children).
121. Attorney C at 2.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 5-6.
124. Id. at 5 ("I'm not pleased with what I did in this case. I'm still bothered with it.")
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In another case, this attorney interviewed the parties but "isolated"
himself from the other participants. 125 Although he attended the hear-
ing, he did not call or cross-examine witnesses; when the child was
interviewed by the judge in chambers, the attorney did not accom-
pany his client. Again, the court ruled contrary to the attorney's view
of the case; again, in retrospect, he regretted his inaction. 26 He con-
cluded that "even an experienced lawyer is a novice in this area"
and that the law on the child's status in the litigation should be
clarified to communicate the procedural options available to the
child's legal representative.1
27
In sum, attorneys who labeled themselves factfinders frequently
described ways in which they evaluated evidence, shaped an argu-
ment for the court, decided to curtail an investigation, and negotiated
settlements. The one attorney who confined himself to investigation
concluded that this failed to protect the interests of the child. For
the other attorneys, who went ahead and took on duties other than
factfinding, the theoretical role conceptions proved simply irrelevant
and were discarded unnoticed as the attorneys responded to their per-
ceptions of the child's interests.
C. Reconstructing Theory from Practice
Departures in practice from the theoretical role conceptions ap-
pear reasonable once incorrect views of the legal representation due
a child are exposed. The tenets of legal representation for adults can-
not be adopted for children without amendment. Yet to restrict law-
yers for a child to the role of either factfinder or advocate would
preclude some of the very protections sought by the provision of a
legal representative for the child in divorce custody disputes.
Unlike most adult clients, the child may not have an opinion on
the issue before the court and, even with adult help, may not come
to formulate one. Too young, too immature-or too mature-to ad-
vance a preference for a custodial parent, the child may not have a
viewpoint that lends itself to advocacy before the judge.' 28 An advo-
cate for the child who seeks to make the child's preference conclusive
125. Id. at 2.
126. Id. at 3. He explained, "I have no trouble representing children; it's the pro-
cedural stuff that gets me." Id. at 6-7.
127. Id. at 7. Although he only represented the child in one custody case, another
attorney who had the most years of legal practice concluded that his expertise was not
required for handling these cases.
128. See Adolescence, supra note 11, at 493-94 (in contrast to latency-aged children,
adolescents desire-and are able-to detach from both parents and avoid demands for
allegiance).
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runs into additional problems if he discovers reliable reasons for
distrusting the child's expressed view.129 One proposed solution for
the advocate is to present to the court not the child's preference but
instead the position recommended by a psychological professional. 130
Many psychological experts, however, concede that their skills are
sorely inadequate to construct a conclusive test for the custody de-
cision,13' and this supports judicial reluctance to turn legal decisions
over to psychological experts.' 32
The factfinder, on the other hand, could gather expert recommen-
dations, the preference of the child, and other information for the
court while remaining consistent with the definition of his role and
recognizing the qualities of a child that may render advocacy inap-
propriate. The factfinder, however, would not be empowered to coun-
ter the parents' arguments or to adjust the pace of the litigation in
light of the child's needs-in short, to fulfill the purposes of legal
representation for the child that rest on recognition of the child's
interests during the suit. 33
Another shortcoming of the theoretical conceptions of the role of
attorney for the child is their failure to recognize the importance of
mediation, negotiation, and settlement, 34 which persistently appeared
in the attorney interviews.' 3 5 This may be due to perceptions about
129. See, e.g., p. 1147 supra.
130. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 3, at 65-67 (child's advocate to bring to
court's attention "least detrimental alternative" based on "child's sense of time," limits
of courts, and child's relationship with "psychological parent"); ef. Derdeyn, supra note
36, at 1374-75 (greater role for psychological experts with greater attention to child's
rights); Foster & Freed, supra note 36, at 443 (courts lack expertise and might better
rely on psychological experts).
131. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 3, at 51-52 ("No one-and psychoanalysis
creates no exception-can forecast just what experiences, what events, what changes a
child, or for that matter his adult custodian, will actually encounter."); Ellsworth & Levy,
supra note 1, at 199-200 (distrusting psychological test for custody determination because
tests administered at time of discord, and bias of tester tends to identify excessive path-
ologies); Mnookin, supra note 6, at 286-87 ("I do not think that existing psychological
theories provide the basis to choose generally between two adults where the child has
some relationship and psychological attachment to each.")
132. Cf. Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444, 455-57 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Bazelon,
c.J.) (expert witnesses should not decide legal questions of insanity but instead should
provide information to permit informed decision by those legally responsible to decide).
133. See pp. 1132-34 supra.
134. See Mlyniec, supra note 6, at 8-9 (catalog of roles appearing in state statutes
includes no mention of settlement).
Instead, critics are concerned with the possibility that the child's attorney may make
the proceeding more adversarial. See Berdon, supra note 5, at 164 & n.52 (noting but
rejecting argument); p. 1133 infra.
135. Attorney A at 3, 8; Attorney G at 32; Attorney H at 2, 3, 6; Attorney I at 19;
Attorney J at 34-37; Attorney K at 10, 23; Attorney L at 8, 14, 31-32; Attorney M at
13, 17; Attorney N at 30; Attorney 0 at 27; Attorney P at 28; Attorney R at 31.
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guardians ad litem' 36 or misguided solicitude for children; 137 in any
event, the commentators have not noticed that the child's representa-
tive in the custody suit is ideally placed to facilitate settlement. The
practitioners, fortunately, have noticed. 3
8
Ultimately, both role conceptions founder on their shared assump-
tion that custody adjudication fits one of the two standard models
of litigation. 139 Either view of the child's representative-as adver-
sarial advocate 140 or inquisitorial factfinder' 41-provides a misleading
perspective on the position. For the child is not a party but rather
is the individual whose interests-once determined-must by law pre-
vail. This undermines the adversarial assumptions of the advocate
role, because a legal representative for the child's interests may as
properly seek to mitigate the adversary nature of the conflict as to
participate in it. It also upsets the inquisitorial framework for the
factfinding role. Although the factfinder is introduced as an impartial
investigator, he is to be impartial only with regard to the parents,
and even then, only initially. Entrusted with finding the information
pertinent to the child's interests, the factfinder ends up looking very
much like the advocate. The representative for a child serves as a
preliminary decisionmaker who evaluates the child's interests, since
he is necessarily involved in sorting through competing psychological
136. Because the guardian ad litem should protect the child against an adverse party,
he was warned by one court against submitting the case to arbitration because the settle-
ment was voidable. Millsaps v. Estes, 134 N.C. 486, 46 S.E. 988, 990 (1904).
137. Note, Due Process for Children: A Right to Counsel in Custody Proceedings, 4
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 177, 187 (1974) (criticizing "informal, paternalistic sys-
tem," whose benefits "do not in practice exist"); cf. Platt & Friedman, The Limits of
Advocacy: Occupational Hazards in Juvenile Court, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1156, 1160, 1183-84
(1968) (juvenile clients often regarded by court and lawyers as subordinate nonpersons
with dependent status rather than bargaining power). The fear that any settlement of
the case will be at the child's expense perpetuates such misguided solicitude. See, e.g.,
Watson, supra note 15, at 59.
138. See note 135 supra (citing instances of settlement).
139. On the adversarial and inquisitorial models, see J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, PRO-
CEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 23, 26, 38 (1975); Chayes, The Role of the
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282-83, 1286 (1976).
140. See J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, supra note 139, at 38.
141. See id. at 23, 26; A. Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Superision in
Three "Inquisitorial" Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240, 248, 279
(1977).
Recent scholarship suggests that the models are imperfect even where they are in-
tended to apply directly. Chayes, supra note 139, at 1282-83, 1286 (traditional adversary
model no longer applies in public law litigation); A. Goldstein & Marcus, supra at 240,
279 (plea bargaining replaced adversarial model in American criminal systems; judicial
supervision less dominant than theorized in "inquisitorial" systems). The models seem
even less instructive for the divorce custody suit, which is neither completely adversarial
nor nonadversarial. Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, PROFESSIONAL REsPON-
SIBILITY OF THE LAWYER: THE MURKY DIVIDE BETWEEN RIGHT AND WRONG 87-88 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as THE MuRuKY DIVIDE].
1155
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 87: 1126, 1978
theories, ongoing tension between the rights of fathers and rights of
mothers, and shifting views on morality and lifestyles deemed harmful
to children.142 To represent fully the child's interests, the represen-
tative should protect the child from prolonged uncertainty and es-
calating conflict. Yet the factfinder and advocate conceptions of the
role do not respond to these needs.
The attorneys who were appointed to represent children in di-
vorce cases in Connecticut did not neglect these needs of the children.
To the contrary, they found ways to respond to the configurations
of each case by addressing the needs of the individual child. They
investigated, counseled, and mediated between parties, functions com-
mon to many areas of legal practice.
143
Critics have warned that such a broad and flexible conception of
the role of a lawyer will lead to abuses in practice, particularly if
the client is unschooled or unsuspecting-as is a child.14 4 Yet an un-
142. See Glendon, Power and Authority in the Family: New Legal Patterns as Re-
flections of Changing Ideologies, 23 AM. J. Comp. L. 1, 27-33 (1975); Woody, Behavioral
Science Criteria in Child Custody Determinations, 3 J. MARR. & FAm. COUNSELING 11, 14
(1977) (changing social conditions alter traditional presumptions held by professionals).
143. The Code of Professional Responsibility directs an attorney to treat other parties
with consideration and avoid inflicting "needless harm." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILiTY EC 7-10 [hereinafter cited as CPR]. Although the attorney is instructed to
represent the client zealously and to uphold the adversary system, the Code reflects au-
thority that the adversary system should be modified where it is not appropriate. Cheat-
ham, The Lawyer's Role and Surroundings, 25 ROCKY Mr. L. REV. 405, 410 (1953),
cited in CPR, supra at EC 7-1, 39C n.3. Such modifications are frequent in practice.
Thus, in business practices, lawyers often become involved on a continuing basis with
particular clients and organizations, giving advice and helping to administer ongoing
enterprises. V. COUNTRYMAN, T. FINMAN & T. SCHNEYER, THE LAWYER IN MODERN SO-
cIErY 229 (1976). See generally Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK
(1967).
In divorce practice, attorneys are advised to counsel their clients, not just act as
advocates. Elkins, A Counseling Model for Lawyering in Divorce Cases, 53 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 229 (1977); Probert & Brown, Theories and Practice in the Legal Profession, 19 U.
FLA. L. REV. 447, 464 (1967). A range of functions for the lawyer is particularly common in
representing someone not considered to be a full adult under the law. Observers of
juvenile courts recommend that the child's lawyer help the child and family understand
and respect the court experience. J. POLIER, A VIEW FROM THE BENCH: THE JUVENILE
COURT 67 (1964); Kay & Segal, The Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court Proceedings:
A Non-Polar Approach, 61 GEo. L.J. 1401, 1420 (1973). The role of child's attorney in
divorce custody offers perhaps greater variety in functions and opportunities to help
the client-as the individual whose interests are to prevail. The more troubling aspect
of the role (and that which allows for expanding responsibilities) is that the attorney
represents a client who has limited abilities to perceive or communicate his own interest
before a court itself limited in articulating the standard for decision. Fears of abuse,
however, seem unfounded. See pp. 1157-72 & notes 145-220 infra.
144. See Mlynicc, supra note 6, at 15-17; pp. 1158-59, 1171-72 infra. In describing
one representation, Justice Brandeis characterized his role as "counsel for the situation,"
Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683, 702 (1965),
a view that met with heavy criticism during the Senate hearings on his nomination to
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derstanding of the client's needs and relationships to other parties can
provide guidance for a lawyer where traditional or restricted role
conceptions cannot. An examination of the attorney's relationship to
the child and to other participants in the custody determination can
provide the foundation of principles for practice, and the experiences
of practitioners can refute apprehensions about abuse of the role of
child's representative in divorce custody disputes.
III. Attorney and Client
The problems of the practitioner in representing a child in di-
vorce custody proceedings are discussed here and in Part IV accord-
ing to four categories. This Part discusses the attorney's relationship
with his client. Part IV will examine the attorney's relationship with
the child's parents and their attorneys; his use of investigative agen-
cies, psychological professionals, and confidants of the child; and his
division of responsibility with the judge.
In each of these categories, fears have been raised about possible
inadequacies or abuses of the attorney's role. The experience of Con-
necticut attorneys is used first to show that the fears in each category
are unfounded, greatly exaggerated, or simply problems endemic to
lawyering. The Connecticut experience is then used to highlight other
problems and to justify principles that for normative or pragmatic
reasons should guide attorneys who represent children in divorce cus-
tody and visitation disputes. The principles do not tell the practi-
tioner what to do.145 Instead, they recognize recurring issues and prob-
lems, suggest ways of approaching the problems, and identify factors
the practitioner should consider in making his own resolution of the
quandaries he faces. The discussion in Parts III and IV proceeds on
the recognition that principles may clash and may vary considerably
in weight and prominence according to the particular case. Potential
the Supreme Court. A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 465-508 (1946). More recent
criticism appears in Frank, supra at 708-09. On the possibilities of being "counsel for
the situation" in child custody cases, see pp. 1176-77 & note 246 infra.
145. See R. DWORIuN, TAKING RIGHTS SmiousLY 25-26 (1977) (principles, as opposed
to rules, "do not set out legal consequences that follow automatically when the condi-
tions provided are met"; a principle "states a reason that argues in one direction, but
does not necessitate a particular decision"); cf. Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through
Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REv. 637, 644 (1976) (where
norms conflict in nonformal negotiation, "account is taken of both, although the even-
tual settlement may reflect an adjustment for relative applicability and weight"). But
see Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 838 (1972) (arguing
that only logical difference between principles and rules is that former prescribe "highly
unspecific" acts while latter prescribe "relatively specific" acts).
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clashes between principles cannot be settled a priori, but must be re-
solved through judgment informed by the circumstances.' 46
A. Doubts, Problems, and Empathetic Responses
The interviewed attorneys recognized that they were operating in
an area where two particularly difficult problems are present: rep-
resenting a child and representing a child who is likely to be in emo-
tional turmoil and to feel threatened by the situation.
Since children are frequently not as capable of informed decision-
making as adults, counsel for the child must be ready to take on ad-
ditional responsibilities for decisions on behalf of his client.147 Yet
the extent of the responsibilities varies according to the competence
and articulateness of each particular client,148 so a simple legal pre-
sumption is not appropriate. 149 In representing children whose custody
was at issue, the lawyers felt a responsibility to be particularly sensi-
tive so as not to add to the trauma their clients may have been
experiencing. 150
Critics have expressed doubts that attorneys possess the degree of
skill and sensitivity required. Lawyers may not be competent to talk
with children, particularly young ones;' 5 ' where a child is not fully
146. The theory expressed is drawn from the moral theory known as "ethical plural-
ism," which argues that moral decisions must consider a plurality of first principles
and that there is no single supreme principle from which the moral rightness or wrong-
ness of every action can be derived. "According to this view . . . the moral reasons for
(or against) some actions lie in the consequence of those actions, while the moral reasons
governing other actions arise from their being of a kind required (or prohibited) by a
rule of duty or obligation." P. TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS 57 (1975). In any given
situation one decides by
weigh[ing] the comparative importance of these various reasons to see which reasons
outweigh or override any others applicable to the given action. . . . Even among
equally competent and sensitive moral thinkers, therd will at times be disagreements
about the relative importance of the various reasons for action. All that can fairly
be demanded of anyone in such circumstances . . . is that the individual in question
be thoroughly conscientious and impartial, weighing all the considerations morally
relevant to every alternative course of action open to him.
Id. at 58. For an application of pluralism in political theory, see B. BARRY, POLITICAL
ARcUMENT 3-8 (1965). But see J. RAwIs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 34-40 (1971).
147. See CPR, supra note 143, at EC 7-12 (additional responsibility cast on lawyer
by any mental condition that renders client incapable of making considered judgment on
his own); J. Goldstein, supra note 56, at 72 (adult, but not child, has legal presumption
of general competence that includes capacity to make binding contracts). But see Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (parental consent requirement for minor's
abortion unconstitutional).
148. See CPR, supra note 143, at EC 7-11 (responsibilities of lawyer vary according to
intelligence, age, and experience of client).
149. See note 71 supra (citing sources).
150. See pp. 1160-62 infra.
151. See B. Chisholm, Should Children Have Rights?, in I The Child as Citizen, at 9
(undated monograph by Canadian Council on Children and Youth):
Would such use of legal counsel be undertaken regardless of the age of the child?
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able to understand and instruct his attorney,152 and where the stan-
dard under which the lawyer must make his judgments is vague and
indeterminate, 153 critics wonder whether attorneys can or should make
decisions on behalf of their clients.1 4 Critics question whether the
child ought to be asked to choose and whether the child's choice, if
already made, should be trusted and followed.155
Many of these same doubts were expressed by the attorneys. From
the interviews four problem areas were identified: (1) how worth-
while it would be to talk to the child-particularly a young and in-
articulate one; (2) whether asking questions and conveying informa-
tion on such a sensitive subject would upset the child; (3) how the
lawyer could penetrate literal statements to find out the child's "true"
feelings; and (4) how the lawyer should assess the child's preference if
expressed, and what he should do if he found himself disagreeing with
the wisdom of the child's choice.
Most of the attorneys did not believe that conversing with preschool
What happens with children who are without sufficient language or sufficient ex-
perience to understand? . . . What implications would this development have in
the education of lawyers, since conversations with children who are troubled re-
quire considerable skill and tact. Lawyers who may be very competent in conversations
with adult clients may not be so competent in exploring the feelings and wishes of
a sad or frightened nine-year-old.
Training is thought to be critical:
It is obvious that simply agreeing that legal representation for children in custody
(or other) cases is a good and just thing, in no way guarantees that the quality of
such representation will be uniform from the outset. The issue of training is thus
introduced. Many voices are urging law schools to assess how well they prepare
their students to represent children.
B. Chisholm, Should Judges Interview Children?, in 2 id. at 9. See Watson, supra note
15, at 78 (lawyers should seek advice from psychological professional in order to talk to
children); cf. Inker & Perretta, supra note 7, at 120 (mutual reliance necessary between
lawyer and psychological experts).
152. See B. Chisholm, Do Children Need Lawyers?, in 3 The Child as Citizen, supra
note 151, at 5 (problems in representing children involve potential inability of child
to "instruct" counsel and lack of capacity to understand and give or withhold informed
consent to proposed plan); cf. Mlyniec, supra note 6, at 16 (only where child has stated
preference can traditional attorney-client relationship exist).
153. See p. 1135 supra.
154. See Bersoff, supra note 34, at 45 (where child has no preference, attorney has
no competence to render decision for him); Mlyniec, supra note 6, at 13 (child advocate
not in better position than judge to determine child's best interests); Dembitz, supra
note 10, at 1313 ("experience and expertise of the child's counsel is generally far less
than the judge's in making the ultimate custody determination").
155. See Mlyniec, supra note 6, at 14 (for child, being required to choose between
parents increases anxiety, and choice may not represent true feeling); Siegel 8- Hurley,
The Role of the Child's Preference in Custody Proceedings, 11 FAT. L.Q. 1, 11-15 (1977)
(citing cases in which judges disregarded preference of child thought to be based on
undesirable or improper influences); cf. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 509 (3d ed. 1940)
(possible unreliability of children's testimony due to "childish disposition to weave ro-
mances and to treat imagination for verity").
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children would be of value,156 though their assessments varied as to the
youngest age at which meaningful communication with children was
likely.' 57 Most attorneys talked alone with every child who was at least
school age. 158 A few lawyers said that even if they could not carry
on a meaningful conversation with a young child, they would still
like to meet and observe him.-1 9 With infants and other very young
children, however, attorneys generally looked to others for guidance.
Information and guidance were sought from older siblings or adults
who knew the child well,' 0 or from experts in child psychology. 161
Most of the lawyers were concerned that attorney-client discussion
on sensitive subjects could be a source of discomfort to the child.'
0 2
156. The attorneys are not alone in their perception that little of value can be
gained from interviews with preschool children on matters relating to parental divorce.
Trained psychologists and social workers associated with the Children of Divorce Project
in Matin County, California, found their intervention strategy generally ineffective with
preschool children. Although the children enjoyed their sessions with the counselors,
they were generally unable to comprehend explanations; the intervention strategy was
therefore concentrated on working with and through the parents to benefit the child.
Brief Interventions, supra note 11, at 30-31.
157. Compare, e.g., Attorney C at 4 ("I've seen little kids five or six who can convey
what they want; there shouldn't be any cutoff age for listening or not listening to the
child.") with, e.g., Attorney 0 at 50:
If the child is five or six and tends to be kind of precocious and outgoing, I gen-
erally ask the custodial parent, "Well, what is John like? Will he talk to me?" When
I was younger and taking [more of these cases] . . . . I had too many kids come
into one of our offices and just freeze. And it is a waste of everybody's time. They
sit in the chair and yes or no is all you can get out of them, and sometimes not
that. Unless the child is extremely outgoing, I don't get involved in talking to them.
158. The only exception was Attorney A, who had not talked with a seven-year-old
client, though urged by a parent to do so. Attorney M at 27. But even he suggested that
he might talk with the client as the litigation progressed. Id.
159. Attorney C at 10; Attorney AM at 8; see Attorney F at 23, 26-27 (went to home of
clients four- and two-years old; got no verbal information from them but observed that
they seemed happy and well taken care of).
160. Attorney D at 8 (siblings aged 3, 5h, and 12; attorney chose to talk only with
eldest); Attorney K at 2, 4-6 (client aged seven; attorney relied primarily on social worker
who had counseled child extensively). On the use of such confidants, see pp. 1182-83
infra.
161. One attorney seemed prepared to turn the entire decision over to experts, though
the children were school-aged. Attorney I at 18-19. On the use of experts, see pp. 1180-
83 infra.
162. For example, one attorney said: "I just feel very uncomfortable talking to kids
who are going through that emotional turmoil about what's happening to them. . . I
think it's wrong of me to ask them or expect them to reveal confidences to me." At-
torney B at 14. Attorney D described an interview with an adolescent child whom he
had taken great care to set at ease: "[I]t was kind of sad; he was kind of like sniffling
through the whole thing, and it bothered me, but I felt it was like a necessary operation.
But that is what worried me: you normally don't know how deep you want to go
down." Attorney D at 17.
Kelly and Wallerstein found that many children in the early latency stage "were un-
able to discuss the divorce without increasing their suffering, almost unbearably." Brief
Irnterventions, supra note 11, at 33.
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To mitigate this possibility, attorneys devised ways to set the child at
ease. These included meeting the client in a setting comfortable to
the child, 163 tailoring to each child an explanation of the lawyer's
role and of the problem,0 4 and trying to elicit information gently or
indirectly. 65 Indeed, where no such means were employed the attor-
neys expressed dissatisfaction with the results of the interview with
the child. 16
Although some attorneys felt quite confident in their ability to com-
municate with children and to establish a trusting and friendly rela-
tionship relatively quickly,10 7 others were uneasy about talking with
children in general or about talking with children involved in an
emotionally tense situation.168 In building a rapport with the child,
some attorneys emphasized the use of a soothing and intimate style
of communication; 069 almost every attorney reported using a fairly
163. Frequently a setting was found outside the lawyer's office to minimize formality.
One attorney took his client to MacDonald's, Attorney 0 at 33; another went out for
ice cream with his clients, Attorney I at 10. The most common alternative to an office
meeting was a home visit, described in Attorney A at 4; Attorney B at 14, 17; Attorney C
at 4; Attorney D at 15; Attorney H at 1, 4; Attorney J at 24; Attorney K at 4, 31;
Attorney L at 10; Attorney P at 6; Attorney Q at 10. The main problem with home
interviews was obtaining privacy. One attorney solved the problem by asking the parent
to take a walk around the block, Attorney Q at 10: another found that taking a walk
outdoors with the child helped the child to open up his feelings, Attorney H at 2; a
third talked to his client outdoors "because he had been running around anyway and
I felt that outside was more of a kid's domain," Attorney D at 16.
164. One attorney representing a very young child simply introduced himself as an
aid to the court. Attorney N at 7-8.
165. In spite of this care, the response of the child was not always gentle or indirect.
See note 181 infra.
166. Attorney C interviewed a young child in his office and could remember no
specific attempt to explain himself to the child; he concluded that "It]he child never
formed any relationship with me and was not really able to." Attorney C at 1, 3. At-
torneys B and K, who tried both home and office meetings, found interviews at their
offices unsatisfactory because the child was not comfortable enough. Attorney B at 17;
Attorney K at 37.
167. Attorney F at 10; Attorney Q at 12. Cf. L. TEssMAN, supra note 11, at 497 (in in-
terviews with therapists and with proper encouragement, many children can be quite
open about their wishes in divorce situations).
168. One attorney's discomfort in talking with children was such that he told his
child clients that they must not ask him questions, but only answer his questions, At-
torney 0 at 39-40. See note 162 supra.
169. One lawyer said he tried "just to talk like a friend and let them know who
you are, but in letting them know who you are, don't let them think you are someone
apart from them, and someone distant from them, to identify closely with them." At-
torney Q at 28. Other techniques of easing the situation included sitting next to the
child rather than across an imposing desk and asking the child to use the lawyer's
first name. Attorney F at 9, 37.
Attorneys also attempted to frame the issue in a manner reassuring to the child. One
thought it important to emphasize to children "that you are not making a decision as
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carefully thought-out "spiel" to introduce himself to the client. 7 0 A
third of the attorneys explicitly discussed confidentiality or gave some
expression of the lawyer's exclusive loyalty to the child.a71 Most at-
torneys attempted some explanation of legal representation or the
functions of lawyers. 17
2
It was generally recognized that trust and rapport must build over
time.173 Nearly half the attorneys met with the child more than once;
each said that he was able to obtain more and better information from
the child after the first meeting. 74 Many attorneys made a point of en-
couraging their clients to initiate further contact. 175
The attorneys found that talking to a child client was a challenge.
Some reported considerable uneasiness and were unsure of their abili-
ty to handle the situation with the sensitivity required; others found
the experience comfortable and even enjoyable. All the attorneys were
aware of the special problems of talking to children about the custody
or visitation issue and thought carefully about ways to make the ex-
perience better for the child.
to who you love more; you are just trying to decide who you want to stay with because
you feel a little more comfortable there, more at home." Attorney F at 21. Other at-
torneys thought it important to let the child know that his preference would not be
determinative in the court's adjudication. This was thought to relieve the child of a
potential burden as well as to give the child an honest appraisal of the process and of
the child's impact on it. See, e.g., Attorney I at 34 ("rThis has nothing to do with
you. The courts are the only people who are going to decide where you are going to
live .... "); Attorney K at 38-39 (child must know that saying he wants something
does not mean it will happen). When carried to an extreme, well-intentioned but mis-
placed protective impulses may contribute to a syndrome of "learned helplessness," see
note 184 infra, and may over-emphasize the part played by guilt in such decisions. The
principal investigator of the Children of Divorce Project in Matin County, California, see
note 11 supra, has asserted that "we have probably made too much of the amount of guilt
that children feel about the divorce period" and have not been sufficiently aware of
their anger and desire to manipulate. Letter from Judith S. Wallerstein to Kim Landsman
(Dec. 30, 1977) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
170. Except for two attorneys whose clients were too young to talk to or who decided
not to talk to their clients, all attorneys mentioned some attempt to explain their role
to their clients.
171. Attorney B at 15; Attorney D at 16-17; Attorney F at 10; Attorney G at 7; At-
torney H at 4; Attorney R at 6.
172. Attorney A at 11; Attorney B at 15, 38; Attorney D at 16-18; Attorney F at 9;
Attorney G at 7; Attorney H at 1; Attorney 1 at 10-11; Attorney K at 4; Attorney N
at 8; Attorney 0 at 32; Attorney P at 5.
173. E.g., Attorney A at 10 ("[You spend time with your client .. in your office and
out of your office.... And so you get to know somebody for a while they get to trust
you .... "); see Attorney R at 31 (child appreciated having attorney and confided
in him over time as attorney kept promise not to betray confidences).
174. Attorney A at 9-10; Attorney B at 13; Attorney G at 29; Attorney K at 4, 12;
Attorney P at 7-8; Attorney R at 30-31; see Attorney C at 5.
175. E.g., Attorney D at 21; Attorney F at 9; Attorney I at 10.
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B. The Preference Perplexity: Should the Attorney Elicit
a Preference, and How Binding Should It Be?
1. Eliciting a Preference
The attorneys' quandaries over whether and how to elicit a stated
preference from their client indicate the problems in inviting a child
client to participate in the process of deciding his custody. Although
almost half the attorneys reported asking the child his wishes direct-
ly, 170 occasionally softening the question by indicating that it need
not be answered immediately, 177 the rest of the attorneys had qualms
about such a procedure. They instead tried to infer a preference
from the child's attitudes and from answers to questions such as what
he enjoyed-or did not enjoy-doing with each parent,178 how he was
adjusting to a change in living arrangements during the litigation,1 9
and to whom he went with a problem.1
80
The attorneys may have overestimated the need for subtlety in phras-
ing issues to the child and caution in inviting the child's participation
in the decisionmaking. Not only did children in a range of ages fre-
quently volunteer comments related to the issue,"8 ' but the choice be-
tween direct or indirect questioning with older children appeared to
make little difference: older children seemed to know that the attorney
wanted to ascertain a preference and were generally prepared to give
one. -82 Indeed, psychological studies indicate that even young children
176. Six of the 14 attorneys who ascertained the child's preference did so by direct
questions. Attorney F at 10; Attorney J at 5; Attorney K at 5, 25, 38; Attorney P at 3;
Attorney Q at 12; Attorney R at 6.
177. Attorney F at 10; Attorney K at 38.
178. Attorney B at 23; Attorney N at 7; Attorney R at 6-7.
179. Attorney G at 6.
180. Attorney D at 20. A child psychiatrist suggests these questions for clinicians to
whom custody cases are referred: "To whom does the child turn when he is hurt or
in trouble, or recognizes a problem? In whom does the child confide? Whom does the
child trust? For which parent does he behave the better, and why?" Jenkins, Maxims in
Child Custody Cases, 26 FAM. COORDINATOR 385, 386 (1977).
181. One attorney was startled by the lengthy tirade against a parent that was
unleashed by what he considered to be a general, nondirective question. Attorney H
at 4. In another case a young boy's feelings became apparent before the attorney had
a chance to begin questioning the boy. The child
was sitting there with his father and his father had just outlined this list of abuses
that the mother had been guilty of, very delicately stated but in front of the child.
And he turned to the child and stated: "Tell him; tell him how she did that."
The child sat there absolutely silent and the father pushed it . . . and pushed it.
The child . . . finally . . . got up and . . . the child ran over to his father. Punched
his father, bit his father, kicked his father . . . . [A]nd the father was coming on
like, "Now, now, Johnny; that's not nice. Tell him about your terrible mother."
Attorney N at 19-20.
182. Three attorneys reported cases where the child volunteered a preference with-
out being asked. Attorney C at 1, 4; Attorney H at 1 (by implication); Attorney K at 4.
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are quite sensitive to the disputes surrounding parental divorce and
may feel depressed or angry about being excluded from participation
in important decisions concerning their future family life. 83 The
desire to protect children by keeping them uninformed about the
course of the litigation and about the attorney's role in it and unin-
volved in the decisions to be made by the attorney on behalf of the
child may therefore be misplaced.'
8 4
Counsel for the child therefore should not neglect the attorney's
183. See McDermott, supra note 11, at 1429-30 ("The exquisite sensitivity of these
young children to the ways in which parents were feeling toward each other is in
contrast to the parents' tendency to consider them as immune, not old enough to par-
ticipate in the process of working out problems of family disruption").
184. See L. TESsMAN, supra note 11, at 281-82 (describing case where children's faith
in legal system gave way to precocious cynicism toward legal authorities who were
unattentive to their desires); Later Latency, supra note 11, at 264 (describing hurt and
humiliation felt by children at having no leverage in divorce and custody events);
Adolescence, supra note 11, at 482 (describing terrified feeling of children at having
no control over their environment); Letter from Judith S. Wallerstein to Kim Landsman,
supra note 169 (children more likely to feel anger and to want to manipulate than to
feel guilt).
Excluding a child from participation may have future psychological costs. A behav-
iorist (as opposed to a psychoanalytic) theory of depression emphasizes that "it is not
the traumatic event per se that produces depression, but the feeling that one has
no control over the situation." E. HILGARD, R.C. ATKINSON 8: R.L. ATKINSON, INTRODUC-
TION TO PSYCHOLOGY 466 (6th ed. 1975). This theory thus focuses on the phenomenon
of "learned helplessness":
The "learned helplessness" theory of depression suggests that people most prone
to depression are those whose lives have been full of situations in which they were
unable to obtain gratification or avoid pain by their own actions. . . . According
to this view, a childhood of experience in which one's own actions are instrumental
in bringing about gratifications and removing annoyances may be the most effec-
tive protection against depression.
Id. at 467. See generally M. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS (1975) (full theory and empirical
evidence).
Children may be confused and need help in understanding not just the legal situation,
but also the basic facts about their parents' divorce. Although an attorney might not
be considered the best source of information on such matters, he is already profession-
ally involved with the child and, as a concerned adult, can help. This is especially
important where parents have been unable or unwilling to clear up the child's con-
fusion. 'Wallerstein and Kelly note that although parents thought it important to
explain the divorce decision to their preschool children,
[80%] of those in our study had found the task too difficult and-whether out of
shame, guilt, misplaced concern for the child, or inability to communicate with
their very young child-had offered no explanation. As a consequence, the youngest
children were allowed to suffer helplessly with the departure of one parent from
the household, without the support that probably would have been forthcoming
in a relatively minor crisis.
Divorce Counseling, supra note 23, at 12-13. Since attorneys generally do not talk to
preschool children, see pp. 1159-60 supra, and even trained counselors find it difficult to
explain the situation to them, see note 156 supra, explanation to preschool children
should be handled by confidants of the child. Wallerstein and Kelly found it best to
work through the parents to ensure that preschool children were kept informed. See
note 156 supra; cf. Watson, supra note 15, at 78 (children fantasize about events in
divorce and lawyers have obligation to explain what is going on).
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general duty to help the client understand the legal situation, to en-
courage the client's involvement in the decisions the attorney must
make, and to offer explanations for the attorney's decisions.' 8 5 The
extent and sophistication of the explanation that it is possible or de-
sirable for an attorney to give will vary with the child's age and
ability to comprehend, as well as with the situation and decision to
be explained. Where the child is too young for effective attorney-
client communication, explanation may best proceed through parents,
confidants, or psychological experts; 80 and where the content of the
information may carry risks for the child, the attorney may feel com-
pelled to withhold explanation. 87
Psychology and moral theory both warn the attorney not to force
participation on the child. If a client is entitled to participate and
to be informed, he is also entitled to do neither. 8 Studies of children
of divorce indicate that there may be very good reasons for a child's
decision not to become directly involved in the dispute over his cus-
tody, particularly where the parents have already framed any choice
the child makes in terms of loyalty or treason.8 9 In certain situations
and at certain stages of development, the child may wish to resolve a
loyalty conflict by choosing, and that choice may serve important inner
needs,0 0 but in other situations and stages the child may risk emo-
tional turmoil and parental retribution by taking sides.' 91
185. See CPR, supra note 143, at EC 7-8 (lawyer should ensure that client's decisions
are based on information of relevant considerations and should initiate decisionmaking
process if client does not do so).
186. On confidants (including parents), see pp. 1182-83 infra.
187. See p. 1151 supra (attorney felt it crucial to familial relationship not to inform
his clients).
188. Cf. J. Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity,
Entrapment, Informed Consent and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 686 (1975) (right
of client to determine for himself what he needs to know includes right to decide "that
he does not want to know anything").
189. See Later Latency, supra note 11, at 264 (footnote omitted):
rhe central ingredient in the loneliness and sense of isolation these children re-
ported was related to their perception of the divorce as a battle between the parents,
in which the child is called upon to take sides. By this logic, a step in the direction
of the one parent was experienced by the child (and, of course, sometimes by the
parent) as a betrayal of the other parent, likely to evoke real anger and further
rejection, in addition to the intrapsychic conflicts mobilized.
190. Id. at 266.
191. The experiences of younger children can be contrasted with those of the older
children:
[W]here parental pressures [to take sides] prevailed, children in early latency seemed
unable to comply with the demand that they reject one parent totally and align
solely with the other. In this regard they differed from the older children, who
seemed capable of avoiding the anguish of conflicting pulls by forming such align-
ments. These younger children retained their loyalty to both parents, frequently
in secret, and often at considerable psychic cost.
Early Latency, supra note 11, at 29.
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If the child wishes to make such a "strategic withdrawal,"' 0 2 wheth-
er from internal or external conflict, he can communicate this desire
to his attorney. It is important that the attorney not unilaterally de-
cide that his client should be "protected" from participation and expla-
nation in the decision. The court's appointment of an attorney for
the child may enhance the child's self-esteem at a time when it may
be sorely depleted; an attorney who does not encourage his client
to participate in decisions misses this opportunity to raise the child's
self-esteem, 19 3 and may even further diminish it. One principle of child
representation, therefore, is that the attorney should invite the child
to participate in decisionmaking and offer to engage in a continuous
explanatory process whereby the client is kept informed of the issues
and progress of the litigation, the decisions being made by the at-
torney, and the reasons for them.
2. How Binding Is the Preference?
Virtually every discussion of representing children in divorce cus-
tody disputes is permeated by whether the child's preference should
bind the attorney's representation. 9 4 It was a recurrent theme in the
192. On the use of "strategic withdrawal" by children of divorce to maintain psy-
chological development in the face of adversity, see Divorce Counseling, supra note 23,
at 14. See also A. MASLOW, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING 54 (1968) (for any child,
choice to retreat and withdraw can be wise and necessary to growth in certain situations).
193. Many attorneys believed that having a lawyer enhanced the self-esteem of the
children they represented. Attorney F said that his clients enjoyed the idea of having
a lawyer, Attorney F at 9, and that it was good for them to have someone to whom
they could talk freely and without guilt, id. at 19-20, 29. Some of these factors were
mentioned by other attorneys. Attorney B at 43-44 (child appreciated having someone
to give him straight answer); Attorney G at 6 (children excited to have own attorney);
Attorney K at 5 (child bragged to friends about having lawyer); Attorney L at 5, 24
(children get kick out of it); Attorney P at 26 (kids felt they counted in process); Attor-
ney R? at 31 (child confided things nobody else had heard). Accord, Brief Interventions,
supra note 11, at 36:
We discovered in these [later latency and preadolescent] children an acute sense of
reality, orienting them outward, with an equally urgent need to validate their
reality-testing by discussing with someone outside of the family the various details
of the separation and divorce. Intensified loyalty conflicts often made it difficult
to talk with one parent without worrying about betraying the other, and intense
anger acted to push them away from both parents. Thus the therapist's clearly
stated, empathic advocacy for the child apparently filled a void strongly felt by
some of these children.
194. There is a range of views on how binding the child's preference should be.
Berdon, supra note 5, at 165 (child's wishes should govern if child of sufficient age
and maturity to make intelligent choice); Bersoff, supra note 34, at 42-43 (lawyer should
represent wishes of child aged 12 or older); Genden, supra note 7, at 593 (lawyer
required to represent child's preference, but child with preference would be better
served by neutral factfinder rather than by attorney); Mlyniec, supra note 6, at 16
(existence of well-formed preference necessary condition to appoint lawyer for child);
J. Goldstein, Psychoanalysis And Jurisprudence of Child Placement-With Special Em-
phasis on the Role of Legal Counsel for Children (Feb. 23, 1978) (Kenneth G. Gray
Foundation lecture, Toronto, Ontario) (child's preference does not bind his attorney).
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practitioner interviews. Neither the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility'9 5 nor statutory law 1 6 provides a solution to the problem of
whether a child client's wishes bind the attorney. The best interests
standard, with its lack of specific content, fails to provide criteria by
which to judge the correctness or propriety of the child's preference.
Each attorney was therefore left to formulate his own standards.197
Half the attorneys said that an articulate preference by an older
child would carry great weight in determining the child's interests. 198
195. Compare CPR, supra note 143, at EC 7-7 (except in "certain areas of legal rep-
resentation not affecting the merits of the cause," where lawyer can make decisions
on his own, "the authority to make decisions is exclusively that of the client and, if
made within the framework of the law, such decisions are binding on his lawyer")
with id. at EC 7-11 ("The responsibilities of a lawyer may vary according to the intel-
ligence, experience, mental condition or age of a client . . . . or the nature of a par-
ticular proceeding.") and id. at EC 7-12 (additional responsibilities devolve upon lawyer
if client has any mental condition "that renders him incapable of making a considered
judgment on his own behalf").
196. The only guidance from statutory law is that given to courts in considering
the weight to be accorded the child's preference in the final adjudication. The typical
instruction is that the court must consider (but is not bound by) the child's prefer-
ence where the child is of "sufficient mental capacity to make an informed and in-
telligent choice." Siegel & Hurley, supra note 155, at 12.
197. Practitioners expressed considerable ambivalence concerning the general lack
of guidance provided for their representation. One lawyer described his frustration
and ambivalence:
The responsibility, I guess, is to do what's best for the child. I don't think anyone
knows what that means, and because no one really knows for sure what that means
it makes it very difficult for someone who has the responsibility of meeting the
standard. So it would be somewhat easier, I suppose, if the judges changed their
view of what to expect of the attorney of the child. But I don't think that would
solve the problem.
Attorney B at 56. Yet lawyers and judges generally doubted the ability of rules to take
into account important and variable factors. E.g., Attorney D at 49 (in determining
child's best interests "we are all just swirling in there: Family Relations, lawyers, psy-
chologists"); Interview with Hon. Robert Berdon, Judge, Connecticut Superior Court, in
New Haven, Connecticut, at 26 (Nov. 14, 1977) (transcript on file with Yale Law Journal)
[hereinafter cited without cross reference as Judge Berdon]. ("What's the next best [to
the child having a happy, intact home]? In every case it's different. I hope we've thrown
out the rules."); Interview with Hon. Henry Naruk, Judge, Connecticut Superior Court,
in New Haven, Connecticut, at 8 (Oct. 18, 1977) (transcript on file with Yale Law Journal)
[hereinafter cited without cross reference as Judge Naruk]. (All pieces of custody decision
are "part of a sort of kaleidoscope: each case you shake the thing up again and all
the pieces change"). One attorney felt that making decisions without specific rules was
something a lawyer takes in stride: "Just get a feel for it and if you can at least ra-
tionalize the instinctual feeling out of the evidence and meet the legal test, I just think
that's basically how it comes out." Attorney R at 18.
198. See Attorney A at 12-13 (must trust child's judgment more than your own
because you have not lived with parents and child has); Attorney B at 27 (older child
has more right to have his view presented); Attorney D at 31-32 (confused about how
to handle disagreement with child's preference, but perhaps child deserves someone
to speak for him); Attorney F at 6 (age and maturity of 15-year old meant that his
preference must be followed); Attorney J at 22 (where what child wants is reasonable,
no excuse for taking different view if child 11 years or older); Attorney K at 16 (rarely
ought to go against client's wish); Attorney M at 12 (since child over 14 allowed to
1167
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 87: 1126, 1978
And although some attorneys found that with younger children the
problem was not whether to follow the preference, but to determine
what the child "really meant" by what he said, 199 one lawyer asserted
that age was not the most important factor, since "some young children
are quite capable of deciding what's good for them and some older
children are quite incapable." 200 A few attorneys said that they would
distrust most expressions of choice by children because of a child's
tendency to repeat what adults tell him or to form judgments on the
basis of temporary or superficial conditions; many attorneys described
cases in which they thought a child was "brainwashed," "programmed,"
or "bribed" by a parent.201
In contrast to these suspicions about expressed preferences, other
lawyers believed there were compelling reasons to support a preference
even when they did not understand it. One felt that the attorney-
client relationship bound him to represent the child's preference or to
ask the court's permission to withdraw.20 2 Another feared traumatic
or damaging consequences if he were to disregard a teenaged client's
strongly expressed preference.20 3 There was also a recognition, borne
out by subsequent events in two reported cases, that a seemingly ill-
founded preference could prove to be quite sensible..
20 4
Although the attorneys varied considerably in the clarity and com-
pleteness with which they articulated criteria for assessing a child's
preference (or for determining the best placement in the absence
have his way in Probate Court, should also have his way in custody decision); Attorney
Q at 21 (child's input in attorney's decision about 50%); Attorney R at 35-36 (cannot
make 14-year old go where he does not want to go).
199. See Attorney K at 4-6 (therapist who knew child convinced attorney that
seven-year-old client did not really want what he said he wanted); Attorney I at 35
(seven-year-old client):
[W]hen a kid says to me, "I want to live with my father because he has a big
boat," that doesn't mean anything to me. That either means to me, because I am
not trained, that he really likes his father and he is rejecting his mother, and he
can't bring himself to say that . . . . Or he really believes that that is a good
reason for going with his father . . . . I don't know if I am hearing the right
message.
200. Attorney K at 16.
201. Attorney C at 1; Attorney H at 7; Attorney I at 11-12; Attorney 0 at 41; Judge
Missal at 10 ("[T]here is bidding between the parents, and bribery and everything else
to try to get the child to like one parent better than the other."); cf. Judge Berdon
at 18 (concern that awarding custody to more indulgent parent not in child's best
interests).
202. Attorney A at 11.
203. Attorney 0 at 42; accord, Judge Naruk at 8; cf. Judge Berdon at 3 (with older
child, "even if the court should ignore the child's wishes, he's going to go do exactly
what he wants anyway").
204. See Attorney J at 28 (hearing clarified lawyer's view and convinced him that
child's preference was correct); Attorney K at 26-27 (understood teenager's antipathy
for father only after cross-examining father at hearing).
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of a stated preference 20 ) , almost without exception they were troubled
by the prospect of opposing their client's wishes in court.206 Aside from
perceived ethical problems, attorneys wondered whether their own
conclusions were to be trusted more than those of the child who was
more intimately involved with the dispute.207 Attorneys, along with
some judges, also wondered whether a decision forcing a child to go
with a parent against his wishes would be unenforceable or counter-
productive in practice .2 0  Proposed solutions to the ethical dilemma
205. The most complete and ambitious attempt to express criteria was that of At-
torney R, who gave the following factors: (1) "with whom does the child most closely
identify" ("[V]ho does the child like to be with? Where does he seem to be the hap-
piest?"); (2) "the ability of the parent . . . to properly take care of the child" ("[I]s
the child going to be left alone with strangers for long periods of time?"); (3) the eco-
nomic status of the respective parents; and (4) whether either parent had remarried
and so could provide a two-parent home for the child. Attorney R at 16-17.
In interviews with other attorneys, best interest standards were not explicitly stated,
but were inferred by the authors from the justifications given by attorneys for decisions.
Because the parties frequently charged each other with failure to meet minimum stan-
dards of parental fitness or moral conduct, many lawyers found themselves trying to
investigate and evaluate evidence on this factor. Attorney F at 7; Attorney H at 2, 6;
Attorney J at 24-25; Attorney N at 6, 18; Attorney 0 at 32. Other factors of importance
were continuity in relationships, housing, schooling, and the like, Attorney A at 2;
Attorney C at 2; Attorney E at 24; Attorney H at 4; Attorney I at 21; Attorney K at 3;
Attorney L at 11; Attorney Q at 19; cf. Attorney H at 4 (obtained agreement not to
move child until end of school year), perceptions of the child's attachment to and
identification with each parent, Attorney G at 17; Attorney R at 16, each parent's at-
titude toward visitation with the other parent, Attorney D at 14; Attorney G at 17;
Attorney 0 at 12; see Seymour v. Seymour, No. 14 86 29, memorandum of decision at
10, (New Haven County Super. Ct. Nov. 25, 1977) (Berdon, J.) ("Visitation is an
important factor to be considered when determining custody. Certainly the parent
who will freely afford visitation as opposed to one who will present obstacles to visita-
tion should be a factor in considering custody."), the parent's sincerity in seeking
custody, Attorney B at 53; Attorney F at 26; Attorney K at 8, 16; Attorney N at 22;
Attorney 0 at 37, a parent's past involvement in the child's activities and familiarity
with his habits, interests, and problems, Attorney D at 23; Attorney G at 8, 11; Attor-
ney N at 10-11, and the feasibility of each parent's custodial plan, Attorney D at 24;
Attorney E at 23-24; Attorney G at 7; Attorney R at 17.
206. Only Attorney H seemed consistently able to disregard or attach little impor-
tance to the child's preference, even with older children. Attorney H at 5-7.
207. See notes 198, 203 & 204 supra. Even if the child's preference does not bind
the attorney's representation it should carry great weight, for it comes from the one
person most aware of how well each parent cares for him. Attorneys would do well
to heed a child psychiatrist's advice to his fellow clinicians: "Respect the perceptiveness
of the children in recognizing which parent really cares more about them, and which
parent is more dependable." Jenkins, supra note 180, at 386. See Attorney A at 12 ("I
haven't lived in the house and gone through what he went through in a custody situa-
tion .... "); Judge Naruk at 8 ("[T]eenaged children have lived with both parents
long enough; they have become sophisticated enough to be able to judge well. I've
had children say to me, 'you know my father's much more strict than my mother, but
I really think that I'm better off with him.'")
208. See p. 1168 & note 203 supra; Attorney R at 35 (teenage client):
I would have liked to have recommended in this case some kind of forced visitation,
even if it was only an hour a week. I'm not sure that would have done any good
because I don't think any judge in the court would have enforced it even for an
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of opposing a client's position included requesting the court's per-
mission to withdraw,20 9 requesting appointment as guardian ad litem
rather than as attorney2 10 or making some sort of full or partial dis-
closure to the court that would include a statement of the child's
wishes. 211 None of these solutions is entirely satisfactory, because each
in some way weakens the legal representation available to the child.2 12
In practice attorneys rarely opposed a clearly expressed preference
of the client, and most discussion of how to solve the quandary was
hypothetical.
2 13
hour. I think most of the judges would say with respect to that kind of a situation,
"I'm not going to enforce it. I'm not going to make the kid go where he doesn't
want to go."
Cf. Ellsworth & Levy, supra note 1, at 200-01 (citing "tentative evidence" that foster
care placements more successful when child agrees to them).
209. Attorney A at 11 (speaking hypothetically).
210. Attorney K at 51 (speaking hypothetically).
211. Cf. Berdon, supra note 5, at 165 (where attorney disagrees with child's prefer-
ence he should report preference and take no position). If counsel for an indigent
criminal defendant finds an appeal to be frivolous, he must accompany a request to
withdraw with a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably sup-
port the appeal. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, rehearing denied, 388 U.S. 924
(1967). Full disclosure by an attorney-stating the child's preference and the attorney's
reasons for opposing it-would run perilously close to a denial of due process if an
analogy to criminal law representation by defense counsel holds. See Suggs v. United
States, 391 F.2d 971, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (defense counsel's brief, whose thrust was to
show that appeal without substance, held impermissible "brief against the client").
212. Withdrawal from representation is an extreme step and one that the Code of
Professional Responsibility permits only in certain restrictive circumstances. See CPR,
supra note 143, at DR 2-110. It could be argued that a lawyer could withdraw from
representation when he disagrees with a child's preference only if he could show that
the client's "other conduct renders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry out his
employment effectively," id. at DR 2-110(C)(1)(d). The lawyer's withdrawal could prej-
udice the child's interests by delaying the proceedings and by indicating to the judge,
by withdrawing, that he thought the client's view was wrong.
A request to be appointed guardian ad litem because of a disagreement with the
child's preference sends a signal to the judge similar to a request to withdraw and
has added disadvantages for the child. The child is deprived of a full advocate, has
an unwanted guardian forced on him, and is not allowed to search for an attorney
who will advocate his view.
Partial disclosure-telling the court the child's preference and nothing more-also
denies the child a full advocate. In practice, moreover, it may differ little from full
disclosure: the lawyer may not tell the judge why he disagrees with the client, but a
judge would not miss the implication from the attorney's inaction that attorney and
child disagree. Cf. M. FREEDMAN, LAwYER's ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 37 (1975)
(in criminal trial, when defense attorney does not refer to testimony of client he knows
to be perjured, he indicates to jury that he knows defendant lied).
Counsel for the child is not necessarily the exclusive advocate for the child, nor is
he necessarily the only means by which a judge can be informed of the child's views.
See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 841 n.44 (1977) (where all
contenders for custody of children share guardianship responsibility, independent counsel
for child not "solely authorized to determine the children's best interest"). As the only
lawyer whose primary loyalty is to the child, and as one who can be uniquely per-
suasive to the judge, see p. 1184 infra, counsel for the child is potentially the most
effective advocate for the child.
213. Compare notes 209 & 210 supra with note 206 supra.
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It would be a dubious undertaking to criticize an attorney's de-
cision to go against the child's preference. The standards on which
to base a criticism are not sufficiently definite, and any decision as
to the best course of representation necessarily depends on the par-
ticular facts of the situation. No principle for judging a child's pref-
erence can be derived other than that an expressed preference should
not be dismissed without careful thought. For this reason, however,
the principle of explanation and participation assumes added impor-
tance. The principle gives the client the opportunity to argue with
and influence his lawyer, and thus creates additional pressure on the
lawyer to take the child's preference seriously. Although the child
may not be entitled to any particular outcome or to have his pref-
erence followed, 2 14 he is at least entitled to a continuous attorney-
client dialogue as part of the process of decisionmaking.
The importance of this dialogue is suggested not only by psycho-
logical evidence on children of divorce, 2 15 but also by analogy to a
moral argument that due process of law has a similar requirement.
Due process of law has been interpreted as a moral requirement
that a decisionmaker engage in "explanatory procedures" in which
the reasons for a decision are explained and the "affected individuals
are allowed to examine and contest the proffered reasons." 2101 Ex-
planatory procedures respond to the value of "revelation and partici-
pation"-of "being told why."
217
From a practical standpoint, the requirement that a decisionmaker
explain his actions and invite participation serves the affected in-
dividual by giving him a chance to change the decisionmaker's mind
and to introduce information or a perspective that might otherwise
be overlooked..2 18 Regardless of the effect on the actual decision, it
may also be intrinsically rewarding and esteem-enhancing to partici-
pate in a decision and to understand its rationale.210 These are pre-
214. Only two states (Georgia and Texas) require by statute that a child's preference
prevail with the court, and then only if the child is at least 14-years old and the parent
is not unfit. Siegel & Hurley, supra note 68, at 29.
215. See pp. 1163-64 and notes 183 & 184 supra.
216. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in DUE
PROCESS 126, 126 (NOMOS XVIII; J. Pennock S. J. Chapman eds. 1977).
217. Id. at 127.
218. Id.; cf. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 572 (1975) (not due process case)
(requiring Secretary of Labor to give reasons for not filing complaint as lawyer for union
member "promotes thought by the Secretary and compels him to cover the relevant
points and eschew irrelevancies").
219. Michelman, supra note 216, at 127. Morally, a demand for nonformal explanatory
procedures
might issue from a certain kind of ideal conception of social relations and political
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cisely the qualities of decisionmaking-whether the decision be that
of the lawyer or that of the judge-that may be most valued by a
child in a divorce custody dispute.
220
IV. The Child's Representative and Other Actors
in the Custody Proceeding
Related to the fear that attorneys are not qualified to talk with
children is the warning that the child's attorney will be superfluous.
Providing no suitable skill, he will merely duplicate the work of a
parent's attorney,221 rubberstamp the report of a psychological ex-
pert or the findings of the court's investigative unit,2 22 or supplant the
judge.223 An underlying criticism is that the attorney for the child
will impose a burdensome and needless expense on the parties and
the judicial system 224 and might make the custody proceedings even
more contentious and adversarial than they already are.22 In prac-
tice, however, the attorneys developed unique functions enabling
them to focus the custody adjudication on the child's needs. The fol-
lowing sections sharpen this focus by deriving principles to guide
the child's attorney in his relations with other participants.
A. Parents and Their Attorneys
Instead of duplicating the work of parents' lawyers, attorneys for
children found that, because of their position in the case, they often
arrangements, expressing revulsion against the thought of life in a society that ac-
cepts it as normal for agents representing the society to make and act upon decisions
about other members without full and frank interchange with those other members.
Id. at 128.
220. See pp. 1163-64, 1166 and notes 183, 184 & 193 supra.
221. Solender, supra note 10, at 639; Judge Callahan at 2-3 ("I have some doubt as
to how valuable a function the attorney for the child plays. It seems to me pretty much
of a rehash of what you could get from listening to counsel for both sides.")
222. Solender, supra note 10, at 639. There is also a fear that an attorney would
be less likely to discover information important to the custody decision than would
a social worker or psychological professional. Note, The "Adversary" Process in Child
Custody Proceedings, 18 W. REs. L. REV. 1731, 1744-47 (1967) (lawyers trained to seek
overt facts; social workers oriented toward important intangible elements).
223. Dembitz, supra note 10, at 1313.
224. Brodsky & Alford, Sharpening Solomon's Sword: Current Considerations in Child
Custody Cases, 81 DIcK. L. REV. 683, 694 (1977); Solender, supra note 10, at 642.
225. If the guardian ad litern is to serve his function properly he may feel com-
pelled to make the proceeding more contentious (and so more traumatic) than it
would have been without him. If there is any area of universal agreement about
custody adjudication it is that adversary procedures do more harm than good.
R. Levy, Treatment of Child Custody Problems in the Family Code, at j-4 (Proceedings
of the Institute on the Family Code Project: Southern Methodist University School of
Law), quoted in Ellsworth & Levy, supra note 1, at 225 n.89. Professor Strauss states that
presence of counsel for the child "may even encourage litigation." THE MURKY DIVIDE,
supra note 141, at 73, 83 (Peter Strauss, Prof. of Law, Columbia Univ.).
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could uncover different kinds of information and promote a con-
structive approach to resolve the dispute. Rather than increasing the
scope and intensity of the controversy, many attorneys for children
acted to mediate conflict and settle the dispute out of court.
The possibility of talking to all parties directly22 6 gives the child's
attorney unique advantages in obtaining information about the par-
ents and the child, since this information would rarely, if ever, be
available to a parent's attorney. 22 7 As an investigator and as a rep-
resentative of the person whose interests are, by law, to prevail, the
child's attorney is perceived by the parents as a powerful, occasionally
threatening, figure.228 Minimally, the attorney is recognized as some-
one having leverage with the judge; some parents229 and their law-
yers230 attempted to cajole, lobby, or educate the child's attorney as
though arguing in court.
The incentives for parents to meet with the child's attorney give
226. None of the attorneys reported that he had been forbidden to talk to a parent
outside the presence of the parent's attorney. A typical description of a conversation
with a parent's attorney is: "She just said carte blanche-speak to my client, go out to
the home; I'll instruct my client to assist you in whatever way she can." Attorney Q at 16.
227. Cf. Murch, The Role of Solicitors in Divorce Proceedings, 40 MOD. L. REv. 625,
637 (1977) (parents' solicitors almost inevitably biased because they meet with only one
party). It may be that people hire attorneys to avoid dealing with an adversarial party
face-to.face. See Eisenberg, supra note 145, at 660. Judge Naruk described the child's
attorney as
the filter; he's the conduit through which the other lawyers must go. I would be
afraid that the lawyer for either parent, being an adversary for the interest of a
parent, would try to jockey the child in that position because he's not thinking
of the child. He's thinking of mommy or daddy who's his client.
Judge Naruk at 10.
228. Attorney A at 8; Attorney B at 24; Attorney D at 43; Attorney E at 6; Attorney
J at 16; Attorney K at 9; Attorney N at 9-10.
229. One attorney described this meeting with a parent:
When he came in here, he was very forceful, very articulate, very well spoken,
very calculated in his behavior. He was overly dramatic and almost staged. He just
leaned across my desk and said, "I'm going to tell you something right now, .. .
you know what I have on my side?" I said, "What's that?" And he said, "sincerity,
love, truth." Just like that. Like it was a press conference.
Attorney Q at 42. Another attorney described the progression in the parents' attitudes
toward him during the course of litigation:
The first thing for both sides was exactly what you would expect if you were a
judge in night court in Omaha and speeders were being brought in. There's some
cajoling, some "I didn't really mean it; I'm really a good guy after all." Some of
it is expressed, some of it's not; but it's all the interpersonal mechanisms of winning
approval, and it was really difficult. I was put in the position of a very powerful
figure by both sides, whose snap of the fingers would send these kids left or right.
And I suppose in some senses I was, at that point, as near as they got to such a
power. The judge would ultimately be in that position.
Attorney N at 9-10.
230. Lobbying by the parents' attorneys was described in Attorney B at 7; Attorney
C at 1, 5; Attorney D at 9; Attorney G at 10-1l; Attorney H at 2; Attorney I at 22-23;
Attorney I at 12; Attorney L at 4, 12; Attorney N at 13; Attorney 0 at 12; Attorney Q
at 50.
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the attorney the power and the opportunity to mediate between them.
The child's attorney is both a lobbyist and the target of lobbying.
Just as the parents seek influence with the attorney in the hope of
acquiring influence with the court, so may the attorney seek to in-
fluence the parents to reach an acceptable settlement out of court.
Attorneys said that they often reminded parents that the child's in-
terests must govern the custody determination and that, therefore,
the parents should cooperate with the investigation, 23 1 assess the
child's interests rationally, and drop a tactic-or even an entire claim
-contrary to the child's needs.2 32 Attorneys felt that they could act as
"go-betweens" to settle conflicts during the litigation,"2 33 and on oc-
casion they were called on to arbitrate the conflicts that arose be-
fore the time set for a hearing.2 34 Indeed, counsel for the child is
well situated to fulfill the following functions of the mediator: (1)
diminish conflict by facilitating reliable communication between par-
ties;2 3 5 (2) reduce the stress and intensity of conflict that lead to de-
fensive and diametrically opposed positions;2 36 (3) clarify the real
231. Attorney I at 19, 20, 24; Attorney K at 23; Attorney Q at 16, 17.
232. Attorney H at 3; Attorney Al at 21.
233. Attorney A at 2; Attorney B at 10; Attorney J at 34; Attorney K at 33, 36. Two-
thirds of the attorneys described efforts to arrange out-of-court settlements. Attorney A
at 7; Attorney B at 41; Attorney E at 25-26; Attorney F at 15; Attorney G at 14; Attor-
ney H at 3-4; Attorney J at 9; Attorney K at 10; Attorney L at 6-8; Attorney Al at 13;
Attorney 0 at 29; Attorney Q at 23, 43-44.
234. Attorney A at 1; Attorney R at 23.
235. M. DEUTscH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT (1973). Id. at 353. Impoverished
and unreliable communication is especially likely when divorced parents are disputing
custody. The attorney for the child can play an important role in introducing a more
realistic perspective on the case. Attorney A explained that attorneys for the parents
are often unwilling to tell their clients that they cannot win: "I just don't think they
have enough nerve to tell their clients that .... [I]f the client wants to go through
with it, they don't want their client to think that they are not behind them, and maybe
they are afraid of losing the business .... ." Attorney A at 2. In contrast, "as lawyer
for the children you are in a position to tell parents something that you can't tell the
parents as their lawyer." Id.
Attorney K described settling one case by improving communications:
I talked with the kids, asked them how much they wanted to visit. I talked with
the mother and found out what she could handle and what she wanted. I talked
with the father and found out what he wanted and what he could handle, and
we worked out a visitation schedule.
Attorney K at 33.
236. M. DEUTSCH, supra note 235, at 355. Attorney L described how intervention by
the child's attorney could reduce defensiveness:
The intervention by a neutral third party-because obviously the lawyer for the
children starts off neutral-tends to calm things down. The lawyer for the mother
and the father are by that time so stubborn, set in their ways, that sometimes if
you can give them a way out, you know, "do it for me," or "come on, I'll suggest
it to him."
Attorney L at 31-32.
Attorney A emphasized the importance to both the parents and the children of pre-
venting name-calling contests in court:
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issues of conflict by helping the parties identify where they agree
and disagree; 237 and (4) alter or compensate for asymmetries in mo-
tivation or power between the conflicting parties.
2338
The child's attorney is ideally placed to pressure parties toward
agreement. 23 9 Knowledge of the presence or future involvement of
third parties produces pressure toward agreement in two directions:
"toward deference to norms of fairness, social responsibility, reciproci-
ty, and equity of exchange; and toward the search for alternatives to
their preferred positions." 240 The parents' lawyers are not in a good
If you can . . . lessen the amount of hatred that has to take place among parents,
then you are doing a tremendous service for the children. Because of the fact that
in a contested case, whether on a temporary basis or on a final basis, people are
going to say things against the other parent that they either may not want to say
or may say out of anger, and people never forget that stuff. And then it has a
tremendous effect on the children because one parent's feelings for the other parent
are going to be obvious to the children . . . .And because of the fact that they
know about that is going to create all sorts of conflicts in their lives.
Attorney A at 8.
237. M. DEUTSCH, supra note 235, at 383. Attorney H helped the parents clarify their
agreement that, regardless which way the court decided the custody question, the chil-
dren would not be moved from their school until the end of the school year. Attorney
H at 4.
238. M. DEuTscH, supra note 235, at 382. Attorney K described a modification case
in which the custodial parent's attorney withdrew shortly before trial. Without repre-
sentation, the custodial parent would probably have lost custody because of an adverse
recommendation by the Family Relations Division. Because Attorney K had deter-
mined that no change in custody should occur, he provided assistance to the custodial
parent and obtained stipulations preserving the existing custodial arrangements. At-
torney K at 9-10.
239. A number of attorneys commented on the unique vantage point of the child's
attorney. Attorney I at 28 (able to see perceptions from both sides, like the hypotenuse
of a triangle; able to be truthful to court); Attorney P at 28 (able to work with whole
family, not just one party); Attorney R at 20, 37 (able to avoid tunnel vision of lawyer
for party; able to risk asking "why" questions of witnesses). Attorney D concluded that
the role
gives the lawyer an opportunity to be a little bit of a psychologist, a judge, a
social worker, and not just be a nuts-and-bolts lawyer. But the key is that after
you play all those little roles, you got to pull it together and be a lawyer, to be
able to know what is in your own mind, what is relevant, what is material evi-
dence, what is hearsay, what isn't, who is believable.
Attorney D at 54.
The judges were also aware of the position of the child's attorney and thought that
it was a good reason for appointing counsel for the child where custody was contested.
Judge Berdon at 13 ("A lot of cases have settled as a result of appointing an attorney
for the child."); Judge Callahan at 5 (possible that he has seen few attorneys for child
in court because they have settled cases); Judge Missal at 4 ("'[]f [counsel for the child]
does his job properly, he can be a mediator in the situation, especially with the two
other lawyers. He can try to make them more objective about the case.") Judge Missal
emphasized the importance of the mediator's being another attorney, because the par-
ents' attorneys probably would not respect and listen to the advice of another profes-
sional as much. Judge Missal at 4. This confirmation by judges of the attorneys' views
of their unique value to the process lessens the likelihood that the views were merely
self-serving. See generally note 84 supra.
240. J. RUBIN & B. BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION
56 (1975).
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position to exert these pressures, and they were occasionally reported
to block potential settlements by holding out to win the case for
their clients.241 A few attorneys noted that, as the child's attorney
became involved, the parents' attorneys backed down from their ini-
tial positions and cooperated with the attorney for the child.2 42
To clarify and capitalize on the position of the child's attorney in
protecting the child's interests, the parents and their attorneys should
be told that the child's attorney is independent of both parties, not a
threat from the other side or an additional lawyer for their side.243
The child's attorney should remember that when the dust settles in
and out of the courtroom, the child will continue his intimate emo-
tional attachment to one or both parents. The child's attorney not
only should treat each side with consideration and should avoid un-
leashing new resentments between parties or against the child, he
also has affirmative obligations to protect and represent those child-
parent relationships valued by the child. Representing such relation-
ships requires a standard of care and sensitivity greater than the duty
of lawyers in all types of representation to avoid the infliction of
needless harm.24 4 It requires an affirmative duty to reassure the par-
ents, to treat them with respect during the litigation, and to try to
bring about an outcome that is acceptable and that recognizes their
value as parents.245 To advance the interests of his client, the child's
attorney must represent not just one person but "the situation, ' 24 6
241. Attorney H at 7; Attorney J at 24; Attorney N at 30; cf. Attorney I at 8 (par-
ents' attorneys avoided hearings on child's attorney's motions).
242. Attorney K at 11; Attorney M at 8; Attorney N at 13.
243. See Attorney P at 19; Attorney R at 4-5 (parent told interview was not confi-
dential). Careful explanation is often necessary because of the circumstances under
which the child's attorney enters the case. See p. 1178 infra.
244. CPR, supra note 143, at EC 7-10.
245. To the extent that a child-parent relationship is valued by the child, one or
both parents are what Professor Hazard terms "quasi-clients," defined as persons to
whom a lawyer owes a duty greater than that due strangers but secondary to that due
the client, G. HAZARD, ETics IN THE PRACTICE OF LAw 45 (1978).
Several attorneys mentioned specific aspects of their representation that exemplified
this concept. Attorney G at 30 (persuaded mother, to whom he recommended custody
be given, to accept visitation by father in interest of child's attachment to father);
Attorney K at 23 ("[p]rimarily it's in the child's interest to try to have the parents feel
as positively as they can"); Attorney M at 13 ("losing parent" in custody dispute should
not feel "vilified"); Attorney P at 7-8 (persuaded teenage client who had run away
from home to return to parent).
246. In his confirmation hearing, Justice Brandeis argued that because a client's
interests are often intertwined with those of other parties, attorneys should consider
being "counsel for the situation." See note 144 supra. A recent interpretation of this
role, based on the accounts of practitioners, describes the lawyer for the situation as
an analyst of the relationship between the clients, in that he undertakes to discern
the needs, fears, and expectations of each and to discover the concordances among
them. He is an interpreter, translating inarticulate or exaggerated claims and
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and must try to achieve a fair, amicable, and workable settlement for
both parents as well as for the child.24 7
B. Investigative Agencies and Psychological Professionals
Because the question before the court concerns the welfare and well-
being of a child, many observers are convinced that the child's inter-
ests require an independent investigation by a social service agency
or psychological professional, not by a lawyer.248 In practice, the at-
torneys for the child found that, in contrast to psychological profes-
sionals and social agency personnel, they provided a different per-
spective and set of skills to protect the child's interests.
1. State Investigative Agencies
A contested custody or visitation suit may be referred by the court
for an investigation by a social service agency.240 Nearly all the cases
forewarnings into temperate and mutually intelligible terms of communication. He
can contribute historical perspective, objectivity, and foresight into the parties'
assessment of the situation. He can discourage escalation of the conflict and re-
cruitment of outside allies. He can articulate general principles and common cus-
tom as standards by which the parties can examine their respective claims. He is
advocate, mediator, entrepreneur, and judge, all in one.
G. HAZARD, supra note 245, at 64-65. But see Frank, supra note 144, at 708 (one who
lawyers for situation is likely to regret it).
2.17. See M. GOLDING, PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 113-16 (1975) (adversarial proceedings dam-
age family); Golding, Preliminaries to the Study of Procedural Justice, in LAW, REASON,
AND NAvru E 77, 91 (G. Hughes ed. 1974).
Where a case comes to a contested hearing, counsel for the child may still be able
to settle or eliminate some contentious issues. In a case in which the authors of this
Note were counsel for the child, the lawyers for the parents levied accusations of par-
ental unfitness in a chambers conference and asserted that testimony to this effect
would be given in open court. Counsel for the child summarized his investigation to
the judge and stated that no reason had been found to suspect that either parent
was unfit. The judge announced that he would rely on the report of counsel for the
child and proceed on the assumption that neither parent was unfit. He also suggested
that parents' counsel direct the hearing away from accusations against either parent.
The Assistant Clerk of the New Haven County Superior Court described the way an
attorney for the child handled the cross-examination of an unstable parent:
He had a TNT guy up there [who] could have exploded any time. . . . [The at-
torney] handled the questions so as not to get in conflict, and lose any of the pur-
pose of what he was trying to elicit. And he kept him pretty calm. . . . I know
other attorneys who would get up and cross-examine him until we [would] have
to put him in Connecticut Valley Hospital because you could really send a guy
like that off the edge .... whether it be [from] losing his child or not being able
to have visitation. . .. An attorney shouldn't tear away at a parent. You have to
try to assume that the parent[s] . . . have sympathy for the child. You are not out
to destroy; you are out for what is good for the child.
Sappern Interview, supra note 21, at 11.
248. See note 222 supra.
249. Two state agencies may become involved in some way with custody litigation
in Connecticut. The primary agency is the Family Relations Division of the Superior
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handled by the interviewed attorneys included an investigation by
an officer of the Family Relations Division of the court. 250 Trained
in interviewing techniques and custody law, the officer conducts an
investigation to obtain information on the history of the parties and
the dispute.2 51 The officer's findings and recommendations are com-
piled in a written report that the judge may read at his discretion -;2 r -2
parties may object on hearsay grounds to the inclusion of the report,
and in Connecticut practice the judge may rule either way on the
objection.2 5 3 In the majority of cases handled by the interviewed at-
torneys, the investigation and written report were completed before
the child's attorney entered the case.254 This reflects a common pattern
in divorce custody cases: a Family Relations recommendation in favor
of one party leads to a motion by the other party-seeking "another
bite at the apple" 255-to appoint an attorney for the child.2-50 In this
light, the Family Relations report could be viewed as an initial trial
decision, the child's attorney an appeal, and the court itself the ul-
timate recourse.2 5
7
Did the child's attorney duplicate the work of the Family Relations
investigator? Attorneys reported that they often found the personal
data assembled in the report useful.25  Yet they concluded that the
reports frequently failed to provide accurate and full information on
the child and the child's point of view.250 In contrast with the under-
Court, which does custody investigations. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-182a (1977). In
some cases attorneys may also consult the state's Department of Children and Youth
Services, which investigates charges of child abuse or neglect. See id. § 17-38(e).
250. Of the 35 cases discussed by attorneys, the Family Relations Division was in-
volved in 30.
251. Interview with Bernard Christianson, Supervisor of the Family Relations Di-
vision of the New Haven County Superior Court (Dec. 15, 1977).
252. Judge Berdon at 5; Judge Missal at 7.
253. See, e.g., Schaff v. Schaff, No. 146124 (New Haven County Super. Ct. Nov. 2, 1977)
(Missal, J.); Piatt v. Piatt, No. 139451 (New Haven County Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 1975) (Dale),
J.) (both decisions granting motions to strike Family Relations report from court file).
Judge Missal said that he refrains from reading the Family Relations report if either
party objects to it as hearsay. Judge Missal at 7. Judge Berdon said that on the request
of both parties in one case he read the report but not the recommendation of the
Family Relations officer. Judge Berdon at 5.
254. In at least 17 of the 30 reported cases in which the Family Relations Division
was involved, the report was already completed when the child's attorney was appointed.
255. Sappern Interview, supra note 21, at 18, 20. Another reported strategy was to
move for a pendente lite order to allow a lawyer to test his client's chances for per-
manent custody without inordinate risk. See note 27 supra.
256. E.g., Attorney B at 7, 24-25; Attorney G at 8-9, 33 (parents viewed him as second
bite at apple after Family Relations recommendation submitted); Attorney J at 40.
257. Sappern Interview, supra note 21, at 4, 5, 20; Attorney M at 11.
258. E.g., Attorney F at 4; Attorney I at 15.
259. E.g., Attorney D at 20; Attorney I at 14; Attorney K at 19; cf. Judge Missal at
7 (Family Relations reports generally "much better on the adults . . . than on the
children").
1178
Lawyering for the Child
standing obtained by the attorneys' own investigations, Family Rela-
tions information on the child was found to be misleading and super-
ficial.2 10 As a result, attorneys reported that they disagreed with the
recommendation of the Family Relations report more often than not.261
The differences in the recommendations of the child's attorneys
and the Family Relations Division were attributable not only to dif-
ferent information, but also to divergent perspectives and loyalties.
That contrast is most evident in a case in which the entire investi-
gation was conducted jointly but opposite conclusions were reached.202
A parent had moved to modify custody based on charges of neglect
of the children and drug use by the custodial parent. After interview-
ing the parents, the children, their teachers, and neighbors, the child's
attorney and the Family Relations officer agreed that the child had
not been neglected in any way. They also concluded that the past use
of drugs posed no threat to the child, since the custodial parent had
participated voluntarily and regularly in a drug abuse program. More-
over, the oldest child, aged eight, indicated articulately and definitely
that he preferred to remain where he was.
26 3
Although they shared all evidence and discussed the case through-
out the investigation, the Family Relations officer recommended a
switch in custody while the attorney recommended against modifica-
tion. The attorney explained that he saw no reason to move the chil-
dren, who seemed happy and well cared for, while the Family Relations
officer emphasized the noncustodial parent's material advantages and
more conventional lifestyle.204 Thus certain functions can be per-
260. Attorney G at 5 (attorney observed child over time, while Family Relations
report only portrayed snapshot of child's feelings); Attorney K at 19 ("It wasn't until
after we got to know the children that we realized that the Family Relations report
was misleading with respect to what the children really wanted, especially the older
child."); Judge Missal at 7 ("I am more apt to follow the suggestion of the child's
attorney than the Family Relations if there is a conflict.").
261. Two attorneys reported supporting the Family Relations report and recom-
mendation. Attorney D at 22; Attorney N at 23. Four attorneys reported disagreeing
with the recommendation. Attorney G at 13, 27; Attorney I at 41; Attorney K at 9, 10;
Attorney Q at 14. Eleven attorneys reported disagreement with the assessment of one
or more members of the family by the Family Relations report. Attorney A at 16;
Attorney C at 5; Attorney D at 20; Attorney G at 22-23; Attorney H at 4, 7; Attorney
I at 14, 15; Attorney K at 10; Attorney Al at 7, 14; Attorney 0 at 22, 24; Attorney P
at 21; Attorney Q at 14, 18-19, 60.
262. Attorney Q at 14.
263. Id. at 12-13, 17-18.
264. Id. at 18-19. This may indicate an important difference between an investigator
for the state and one whose loyalties are to the child. Judge Berdon at 5-6:
[Counsel for the child is] a different role from a Family Relations officer. The
Family Relations office is a fact-gathering agency for the court that's supposed to
get the background on the child and get as much information as it possibly can
and make it available to the court, but that's the extent of it. He's not an ad-
vocate for the child, he's not an advocate for anybody.
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formed cooperatively,2 65 but the child's attorney brings a perspective on
the custody question different from that of the Family Relations of-
ficer and can in addition protect the child in court. 20 The attorney's
independent judgment is therefore an important contribution.
2. Psychological Evaluations
With increasing recognition of the significant needs of the child in
the custody determination, observers have noted an expanding role
for psychiatric or psychological evaluations.2 67 What role remains for
the child's attorney in assessing and advancing the child's interests?
The attorneys said that they relied heavily on psychiatric evaluations
of very young or inarticulate children.20 8 Such professional studies
helped to detect evidence of abuse, neglect, or emotional damage and
also helped penetrate the child's literal statements to discover identi-
fication with or preference for one parent.2 69
Yet most attorneys were troubled by the way in which psychiatrists
and psychologists behaved in custody cases.270 The most common
criticism of experts was that once hired by one party, their objectivity
could quickly be compromised.27 1 Because parties occasionally "shop
around" for experts to support their claims, 272 the attorneys felt that
265. See, e.g., Attorney A at 16 (occasionally disagreed with Family Relations report,
but important to have input into it). But see Attorney C at 2 (to avoid prejudice did
not talk to Family Relations officer until both attorney and officer had finished reports);
Attorney I at 15 (did not want to know anything about Family Relations report). Hart-
ford attorneys reported that they had been appointed on the recommendation of the
Family Relations Division and at times conducted joint interviews.
266. Judge Berdon at 19 (child needs lawyer because "ultimately it's got to be
decided in the courtroom").
267. Derdeyn, supra note 36, at 1374-75; Kubie, supra note 49, at 1198-99; Watson,
supra note 15, at 75.
268. Attorney A at 15; Attorney B at 51, 59-60; Attorney M at 16-17; Attorney 0 at 29.
269. [T]he use I put a therapist to is to try to get beyond the face value of what
the kids are saying. In other words, say, tell me whether this is just some propa-
ganda that they're forced to give me because of the influence of the parent who
has them, or in some deeper way it's part of the child's own self.
Attorney J at 11; accord, Attorney I at 15; Attorney K at 5-8.
270. E.g., Attorney D at 49 (should not be too deferential to psychiatrists or psy-
chologists: "we are just all swirling in there"); Attorney J at 11, 45 (concerned that
referral to psychiatrist is just passing buck; his judgment may be no better than
lawyer's); Attorney K at 27 (criticizing psychiatrist who testified about child without
having seen him); Attorney R at 11 (psychiatrist spoke in "gobbledygook." "[a]ll of
which I found fascinating, none of which I believed").
271. See Attorney 0 at 49 ("My experience has been that certain attorneys that do
a lot of divorce work can influence a psychiatrist to a point where I have extreme
credibility problems with their testimony."); Note, Contingent Fees for Expert Witnesses
in Civil Litigation, 86 YALE L.J. 1680, 1690-91 (1977) (bias of experts can be caused by
selection process and by tendency to identify with litigant or attorney they assist).
272. Attorney D at 38, 46; Attorney K at 27-28. The authors also noted this phe-
nomenon in a number of their own cases.
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experts' reports and testimony were less credible than expected. A
related problem was the tendency of experts to testify abstractly rather
than to focus on the particular child whose custody was at issue.273
Most disturbing to the lawyers was the sense that some clinicians ad-
hered to an ideological point of view rather than providing descrip-
tive insights on the child and family.27 4 Aware of the general problem
of turning legal questions over to expert witnesses, 2 75 the attorneys
still expressed hope that the sensitivity and training of psychological
professionals could contribute to informed custody determinations.276
Yet even the attorney who was most enamored of psychiatrists and
most troubled by his own lack of training to communicate with chil-
dren concluded that it would be unwise for the child's attorney simply
to follow the instructions of an expert.277
Some lawyers responded to this problem by consulting with experts
while maintaining a critical stance. These lawyers felt that they could
assist their client and the court by applying their own common sense
and other information about the case to detect superficial or unsub-
stantiated judgments by experts. 27 8 On this basis, attorneys found the
most credible and helpful consultants were not experts brought in to
evaluate the child or parents at the time of the custody determination.
Instead, psychological professionals who were involved in continuing
therapeutic relationships with the child or family were valued for their
familiarity with the situation over time and for their expertise not
only in analyzing, but also in helping the child and family.27 9
273. Attorney D at 46; Attorney E at 18-19; Attorney K at 27; Attorney R at 11-12;
see Attorney Al at 26.
274. Attorney A at 3; Attorney D at 46; Attorney M at 16-17, 26; Attorney R at 11-12.
275. Attorney B at 59-60; Attorney D at 40, 46; Attorney J at 45; Attorney Al at
16-17; Attorney R at 13-14.
276. Attorney B observed a session between a psychiatrist and a child and concluded:
The child psychiatrist knew how to talk to that kid-to get information in a very
innocent kind of way. It was a very telling interview. I don't know how to do
that .... I'm not sure that I'm getting the right information, not sure that I'm
interpreting the information that I get correctly. I'm not sure that someone else
couldn't get better information and I'm not sure that I'm not getting the infor-
mation at perhaps a price that the child is paying in terms of being forced to
disclose to a virtual stranger intimacies.
Attorney B at 58-59. Another attorney consulted with a psychiatrist before he met
with his clients to find out what kinds of questions were appropriate and what could
be harmful, Attorney R at 7-8. But see Attorney A at 3 (undecided as to validity of
psychiatrists' assessments); Attorney R at 13-14 (absent claim that parent's psychological
condition poses physical threat to child, not convinced that psychiatrists add much
to adjudication).
277. Attorney B at 60.
278. Attorney A at 3; Attorney B at 59-60; Attorney E at 21; Attorney M at 16-17;
Attorney Q at 61; Attorney R at 11.
279. Attorney E at 9-11; Attorney G at 29; Attorney K at 6; Attorney R at 22, 25.
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In cases lacking ongoing therapeutic consultation, attorneys dis-
covered that nonprofessionals who knew the child and family well
could be as or more useful than experts. 28 0 Teachers, friends, neigh-
bors, grandparents, and other relatives, along with therapists, might
be called "confidants": persons close enough or trusted enough by
the child to know what the child wants and needs.28' Attorneys found
these persons valuable in identifying the child's problems and in in-
vestigating allegations of parental unfitness.28 2 Older siblings often
acted as spokesmen for younger, less articulate children.2-8 3 The at-
torneys for the child found that confidants of the child were some-
times more willing to talk, and to talk candidly, with the child's rep-
resentative than with other persons active in the case.2814
Although the appropriate place for psychological experts in the
custody determination remained problematic for the attorneys, the
representatives for the child performed distinct functions in weighing
the credibility and usefulness of psychological reports. Seeking an in-
dependent view of the situation, the lawyers often received discern-
ing perceptions from other people who had the confidence of the child
and family. The attorney for the child can and should, by working
in cooperation with people who know the family well, place expert
evaluations in the context of other information and perspectives on
the child and family. The child's attorneys opposed the introduction
of an expert to evaluate the child when an attorney already felt
280. Attorney C at 4; Attorney G at 16, 31; Attorney N at 12; Attorney Q at 39.
281. Attorney G at 29 (information obtained from school psychologist helped attor-
ney assess child's reaction to pendente lite situation); Attorney J at 8-10 (children's
therapist could explain both what children felt and what they needed in situation,
providing court with "not just the professional opinion, but the children's opinion").
282. Attorney G found by talking with the mother-in-law of one parent that a
continuing religious disagreement had motivated the father-in-law's serious charges of
unfitness against the parent. Attorney G at 2. A therapist who had been involved with
both mother and child advised Attorney K that although the mother had emotional
problems, she was not unfit. Attorney K at 4-5; accord, Attorney B at 10, 32; Attorney
G at 24; Attorney Q at 21.
283. Attorney C at 4; Attorney D at 16; Attorney J at 7-8; Attorney Q at 39-40
(older children provided information about younger child's general feelings and un-
spoken preferences and about family situation).
284. Attorney A at 9 ("Some people might be willing to talk to you as attorney for
the. children who might not be willing to talk as much or as openly to the attorney
for the parent."); Attorney G at 31 (close friend of both parents came forward to
speak with child's attorney in confidence). Similarly, at the hearing the child's attor-
ney may be willing to call confidants who would not have been brought to the stand
by parents. In one case, a social worker had been involved in extensive counseling
with both parents before and during the break-up of the marriage. Neither parent
called the social worker to testify; each parent probably feared damaging testimony.
The child's attorney, however, felt that the insights of this confidant of both parties
were enlightening and important for assessing the child's interests, and he called the
social worker as a witness for the child. Attorney E at 9-11.
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certain as to the proper outcome of the litigation,28 5 when he thought
that one of the parties was not seriously pursuing custody,2 6 and
when he perceived no problem of the child or the parents for which
a psychiatrist or psychologist would be of crucial assistance.28 7 If an
expert evaluation is necessary, the child's attorney should emphasize
that information rather than conclusions should be conveyed to the
court.
288
By using friends, relatives, and professionals who have continuing
contact with the family, the child's attorney encourages the provision
of help and counseling to the divorcing family rather than merely
adding to the number of evaluative reports. Families in custody liti-
gation may have too many professionals judging them and too little
empathy and assistance.289
C. The Judge
Some observers maintain that except in unusual instances, the child's
attorney is less qualified than the judge to make the custody deci-
sion.2 0 Others are uneasy about intrusion by the attorney for the child
on the judge's responsibility to protect the interests of children before
the court.
291
285. Attorney G at 20.
286. Attorney A at 5.
287. Attorney L at 12; Attorney 0 at 49. Attorney E opposed a psychiatric evaluation
because a social worker was already providing continuous therapy for the family. At-
torney E at 14, 16.
288. A child psychiatrist has advised his colleagues that their best position is to be
selected and consulted by the child's counsel. Jenkins, supra note 180, at 385. Information
and description would be more useful to the attorney and to the court than clinical
conclusions. Cf. Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Bazelon,
C.J.) (expert witness for insanity defense should receive careful instructions from court
that emphasize need for descriptive information rather than conclusions).
289. E.g., Attorney R at 31:
Here's a child who had been interviewed by [a psychiatrist] . . . ; he had been
interviewed by this Ph.D. . . . He had been tested by this one and tested by that
one, I think I was just one more person in a chain. I'm not sure he really knew
what any of those people were doing either.
Accord, Attorney K at 56 (has opposed psychiatric evaluations as unnecessary and bur-
densome); Attorney P at 17 (opposed additional study by psychiatrist following two
previous evaluations because he feared that child might begin to believe he was sick).
But attorne)s also recognized that psychological counseling rather than evaluation
could be very helpful to a child or family in need. E.g., Attorney H at 8. Attorney 0
represented a child who was "all pent up inside, dying to express his . . . interests."
Supported by the Family Relations officer, he arranged with the parents for counseling
for the child. Attorney 0 at 48. See Letter from Judith S. Wallerstein to Kim Landsman,
supra note 169 ("[Ilt would be very helpful to have somebody represent the interests
of the child in order to 'reduce repetitive investigation by psychological professionals
and make such professional interventions of better quality for the child.' ")
290. E.g., Dembitz, supra note 10, at 1313.
291. See pp. 1134-35 & notes 36-39 supra.
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In practice, attorneys for the child perceived that they could wield
a powerful influence in court, but admitted that they did not control
the custody determination. The lawyers almost uniformly expressed
the view that in cases resulting in a contested hearing the judge relied
heavily on their investigations and recommendations. 2 2 The extent
of the judge's dependence on them was a source of pride to some
attorneys; 293 others were annoyed and troubled by the sense that some
judges shifted the responsibility for the ultimate decision to the child's
lawyer. 294 Yet some attorneys recalled instances when their views had
been rejected or even ignored by judges.29 5 Others reported that the
judge helped to shape the role taken by the child's attorney by asking
him to gather facts on a specific issue,2906 directing him to examine
witnesses during the trial, 29T and requesting that he mediate between
parties out of court.29 8 A number of attorneys said that the judge
would determine whether the child's lawyer should submit a recom-
mendation to supplement his factual report.2 99 Attorneys noted that
they might facilitate an interview in chambers between the child and
the judge.300 Generally, the attorneys explained that they had to com-
292. Attorney A at 7; Attorney B at 25; Attorney D at 27; Attorney H at 6; Attor-
ney J at 30; Attorney K at 13; Attorney M at 11; Attorney N at 14; Attorney 0 at 12;
Attorney Q at 27-28; Attorney R at 28.
Attorney I remarked, "I don't wait for the court to rely on me. I just say, 'look,
this is ridiculous, and this is what I think we should do.' And I just sound like the
voice of rationality in this otherwise crazy situation, because [the parents' attorneys]
positions are so extreme." Attorney I at 28.
293. E.g., Attorney K at 27-28; Attorney Q at 27, 38.
294. Attorney H at 8 ("Some judges cop out and rely on the attorney for the child
to come up with the answer, especially if that attorney is known to be good. But it's
especially dangerous if he's just known to be good but isn't really."); Attorney B at
25 ("The judge was looking to me, I think, more than he should have to do his job ...
[Many judges] view the child's attorney as the judge. I'm not the judge and I feel
fully uncompetent and unqualified to make determinations of what's in the best in-
terest of the child.")
295. Attorney B at 26, 34, 42; Attorney D at 32; Attorney E at 28, 30; Attorney F
at 15, 16; Attorney J at 2-3, 17, 20; Attorney Q at 26. See Attorney B at 25 ("Some
judges . . . view the child's attorney almost as a child himself . . . . That's especially
true of the referees [who are] retired judges."); Attorney H at 8 ("A lot of attorneys
don't like to be 'kiddie counsel,' because they're treated that way by the judge. ...
But it doesn't have to be that way.")
296. Attorney I at 41; Attorney Q at 22.
297. Attorney R at 19; cf. Attorney 0 at 7 (judge directed child's attorney to play
active role in court in order to foreclose appeals).
298. Attorney E at 25.
299. Attorney F at 34; Attorney I at 42; Attorney J at 19; Attorney K at 29.
300. Judges Berdon and Missal expressed reservations about their abilities to com-
municate effectively with a child brought into their chambers for an interview. When
a child's attorney who knew the children well was present, the judges found the
awkwardness of the situation and the anxieties of the child sufficiently reduced to
make the sessions fruitful. Judge Berdon at 9-10; Judge Missal at 6-7.
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pete for the judge's attention as would any other attorney.30 1
The lawyers described two problems they encountered with the
court. Because the judge often waited until one party submitted a
supporting motion before appointing an attorney for the child, the
child's attorney often was introduced too late to work out pendente
lite disputes or to prevent escalation of the conflict.302 Most frustrat-
ing to practitioners was their inability at times to control the schedul-
ing of proceedings because of the workload of the court.30°
By their reported conduct, the attorneys did not impair but instead
assisted judicial protection of children. The attorneys increased the
judge's knowledge about the child and his parents, enhanced com-
munication between judge and child when an interview in chambers
was requested, and attempted to control the temper and speed of
the process. Judicial appointment of the attorney for the child as soon
as the parties indicated their intentions to fight over custody en-
hanced the attorney's effectiveness;3 0 4 supported by consultation with
the judge, the attorney could help restrict the areas of contention
and work for a settlement out of court.
Conclusion
Demands for reform of divorce custody and visitation disputes
arose with the recognition that the needs of children were being ne-
glected. Since the problem is legal to the extent that it must ultimately
be heard by the court, the child needs a lawyer to manage the process
of litigation.
In practice, the interviewed attorneys for the child did much more
to serve their clients. They acted as prehearing factfinders, courtroom
advocates, mediators, arbitrators, protectors, and legal-and sometimes
emotional-counselors. Fears that lawyers are incompetent or unquali-
fied to serve this range of demands proved unfounded in practice.
a 01. E.g., Attorney F at 21 ("[Y]ou have to try to get [the judge's] ear and pump
some information into it, and make yourself important but not overbearing."); Attor-
ney I at 28 ("I don't wait for the court to rely on me. I just say, 'look this is ridiculous,
and this is what I think we should do.
302. See p. 1178 supra.
303. Attorney E at 5, 6; Attorney G at 10; Attorney H at 8; Attorney J at 20, 24;
Attorney M at 28; Attorney 0 at 18, 20.
304. See de Montigny v. de Montigny, 70 Wis. 2d 131, 137-38, 233 N.W.2d 463, 467
(1975) (where petition to modify custody not "on its face frivolous," it is abuse of trial
court's discretion "to fail sua sponte to appoint a guardian ad litein for the minor
children"); Pfeifer v. Pfeifer, 62 Wis. 2d 417, 431, 215 N.W.2d 419, 426 (1974) (Hansen,
J.) (appointment of guardian ad litem at midtrial, when special concern for children's
welfare became apparent, "hardly serves the full purpose of providing legal representa-
tion to protect the rights and welfare of the minor children in divorce litigation").
1185
The Yale Law Journal
Lawyers in our society have performed these functions in representing
adults in divorce and in other legal matters. If there is anything unique
about the role of attorney for the child, it is that the lawyer may be
called on, in one litigation and with one client, to perform any or
all of these functions.
Because the child's counsel is a new type of legal representative,
some commentators have expressed uncertainty and fear about what the
lawyer for the child would do; some lawyers expressed confusion in
describing what they did. For the most part, the interviewed attorneys
responded creatively and flexibly to the demands of the situation,
though they felt burdened by sharing some of the judge's agonizing
over the custody decision. 305 Some attorneys expressed the need for
more guidance, but virtually all emphasized the complex and shifting
nature of each divorce custody dispute. Moreover, no set of rules
adequately describes what attorneys did, nor would any be helpful
to the practitioner. Instead, principles to guide attorneys can be de-
rived from a composite picture of practitioner's experiences, from
psychological studies, and from legal ethics:
1) The attorney should invite the child to participate and should
provide explanation to the extent of the child's desire and capacity.
He should also respect a child's desire not to participate. Although
meeting with a preschool child is rarely worthwhile, the perceptive-
ness and ability to comprehend of even young school-aged children
should not be underestimated.
2) The attorney should be wary of opposing the child's preference;
there may be good reasons for the preference that are not readily
observable.
3) The attorney should act to enhance existing parent-child rela-
305. Attorneys were bothered by the responsibility of making such an important
decision for the child. Attorney A at 12; Attorney B at 2, 9, 26; Attorney C at 2, 6;
Attorney D at 15; Attorney G at 33; Attorney J at 27; Attorney K at 9; Attorney
M at 11, 19; Attorney N at 14-15; Attorney P at 27. Yet they also found it a positive
and satisfying experience. See Attorney A at 1 (enjoyable, interesting); Attorney D at
2, 52, 54 (interesting, educational, gratifying, opportunity for variety); Attorney F at 1,
31 (opportunity to wear "white hat"); Attorney G at 20 (challenging); Attorney H at
1, 9 (fun, interesting, satisfying); Attorney I at 39, 40 (fun, educational); Attorney K
at 59 (enjoyable representing kids); Attorney L at 33 (more enjoyable and interesting
than representing parents); Attorney N at 29 (chance to wear "shining armor"); Attor-
ney P at 27 (opportunity to help entire family); Attorney R at 33 (extremely interest-
ing). Many attorneys may have enjoyed representing children in divorce custody cases
because it is not a lucrative specialty to which any lawyer could devote full time.
Therapists who devoted their full time to divorce counseling felt "burned out" and
"drained." Detachment might avoid this problem, but would preclude the empathetic
response thought crucial to effective assistance. Divorce Counseling, supra note 23, at 19.
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tionships; this requires a duty to the parents greater than avoiding
the infliction of needless harm.
4) The attorney should take advantage of his unique opportunity
to act as mediator and arbitrator in a manner consistent with the
child's interests.
5) The attorney should exercise his own independent judgment
and not simply rely on investigative agencies or experts.
6) Except with a preschool or disturbed child, professional evalua-
tion of the child should not be sought where the child and his con-
fidants can guide the attorney. This avoids needless introduction
of strangers.
7) Where a psychological evaluation is necessary, the attorney
should choose the expert and carefully instruct him to provide infor-
mation, not just conclusions. Professionals, moreover, should be used
to help the child and his family, not merely to evaluate them.
8) If the attorney cannot settle the case and if delay will not serve
his own trial strategy, he should press to have the case heard quickly
and should play an active role in court.
The earlier the attorney is appointed in a contested custody case,
the more effectively he can put these principles into practice. If
the attorney is to expedite and orchestrate the litigation, his appoint-
ment should be made as soon as a real dispute is apparent. In that
way he can do more for the child than agonize.
APPENDIX A: INFORMATION ASCERTAINED FROM ATrORNEYS
Appendix A: Information to be Ascertained from Attorneys
A. Background on the Attorney
1. Picture of his general practice.
2. Why did he get involved in this type of representation?
B. Background on Each Client and Case
1. Age and description of client(s) and parents.
2. What was the specific issue to be adjudicated?
3. At what stage in the process was the attorney for the child
appointed?
a. How long had litigation on the matter proceeded?
b. Was the Family Relations Division already involved and,
if so, what had they done?
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c. What other professionals had already been involved or
consulted on the matter?
d. How had the attorney for the child been appointed?
C. Out-of-Court Activities
1. Ordering of contacts and gathering of information (e.g., Family
Relations Division, parents, other attorneys, client).
2. How was contact with the client arranged?
3. How many times did the attorney talk to his client?
4. Was client contact by phone, in the office, the client's home,
and/or elsewhere?
5. How much total time was spent with the client?
6. Did the client have a preference as to outcome? If so, how was
it ascertained (e.g., volunteered by client, by direct or indirect
questions, intuited)?
7. How well did the client seem to understand the situation and
his lawyer's role in it? Did the attorney attempt to explain this?
8. Did the attorney and client disagree about the correctness of
the child's preference and assessment of his interests? If so,
how was the disagreement resolved?
9. What was the attorney's recommendation to the court and how
was it communicated?
10. What sort of contact or involvement was there with the parents
and with other professionals involved in the case?
11. Were efforts made to settle out of court?
D. In-Court Representation
1. Did the attorney file any motions on behalf of the child or
himself?
2. Did a judge or a referee hear the case and how was it scheduled
for a hearing?
3. How was the attorney's recommendation communicated?
4. Did the attorney call any witnesses or cross-examine those of
the parents?
5. Did the judge talk to the child? If so, under what circum-
stances (i.e., who requested the interview, where did it occur,
who else was present, was a record made)?
6. What was the final disposition?
E. Post-Disposition Tasks
1. Who was billed for the attorney's services and how much was
billed?
2. Was there any contact with the client or the parents after the
adjudication?
3. How did the client learn of the final adjudication?
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F. General Perceptions and Impressions
1. How did the parties view the attorney for the child?
2. What impact on the parents did the attorney think he had?
3. What impact on the other attorneys did the attorney think
he had?
4. How would the attorney evaluate the behavior and com-
petence of other professionals involved in the case, including
the judge?
5. How much importance does the attorney think he had in the
final disposition in comparison with the impact of other at-
torneys, various expert witnesses, the Family Relations Divi-
sion, and the judge's own predispositions?
6. How would the attorney have handled the case differently
with the benefit of hindsight?
7. What impact does the attorney think he had on the client?
8. Will the attorney handle this sort of case and representation
in the future?
9. How does this type of representation differ from representing
parents in custody disputes and from representing children in
other types of legal problems?
APPENDIX B: QUESTIONS ASKED OF JUDGES
1. What are your criteria for deciding whether or not to appoint
an attorney for the child?
2. In what percentage of cases involving contested custody or visi-
tation issues in disputes arising from divorce have you appointed
an attorney for the child?
3. Of what benefit do you hope this attorney will be (a) to you in
your adjudication, (b) to the child, and (c) to the parents?
4. How well have attorneys you have appointed or observed lived
up to your expectations?
5. Have you or would you accept an attorney for the child retained
by one or both of the parents?
6. Would you accept an attorney retained by the child on his own
initiative?
7. Under what circumstances have you or would you remove an at-
torney for the child who had been appointed by the court?
8. Assess the influence on your decisions of the recommendations of
children's attorneys compared with other information you receive.
9. Have you or would you allow the child's attorney to make motions
on the child's behalf?
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10. Does the presence of an attorney for the child change the process
or your method of proceeding in any way?
11. How active in the courtroom and in chambers have attorneys for
children been?
12. How important is what goes on in court compared with what
goes on in chambers?
13. How often and under what circumstances do you interview the
child? Who else is present at these interviews and is any record
made?
14. How would you assess your ability to communicate with children
in such interviews, and how valuable to you have the interviews
been?
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